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norities
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
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* These abbreviations are used in the text when referring to the Regular Reports or Accession Part-
nerships. For example, the 1999 Regular Report on Estonia will be abbreviated RR 1999 EE, Slovakia’s
2001 Accession Partnership AP 2001 SK.4
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and the respect for and the protection of minorities.
European Council, Copenhagen 1993
Introduction
1
In April 2003 ten applicant states signed accession treaties to the European Union.
This marked the endpoint of an intensive preparatory phase in which the candidate
countries’ adherence to criteria for membership of the European Union was annu-
ally monitored in the so-called Regular Reports. As part of the Copenhagen acces-
sion criteria the above quoted political criteria served as an indispensable precon-
dition for any country to join the European Union. The European Commission pub-
lished a first analysis of the presently thirteen applicant country's compliance with
the criteria in its Opinions on the Application for Membership of the European
Union in 1997. Since then, the institution continues its monitoring function by is-
suing Regular Reports on the progress achieved by the individual candidate states
each year. These reports do not only make a clear statement on the adherence of a
particular country to a specific criterion. They also depict a detailed picture of the
overall situation concerning the relevant subject areas. However, despite the fact
that all monitored countries are graded to fulfil the political accession criteria, the
reports continue to draw on many persisting shortcomings. The question thus arises
of how the Commission arrives at its evaluations. How does it apply the criteria to
assess an applicant country's success in meeting them?
This study aims to shed light on the above question by focusing on the criterion
"respect for and protection of minorities".
2 The starting point of the study is the
Regular Reports, i.e. the Commission documents assessing adhesion to the acces-
sion criteria. Following the reports, the situation of the Russian-speaking minority
in Estonia and Latvia and the situation of the Roma peoples in Bulgaria, the Czech
                                            
1 Special thanks to the European Institute for Public Administration and in particular to Ines Hartwig
and Phedon Nicolaides who supported the study and gave a lot of valuable advice throughout its various
stages.
2 For means of convenience I will use the term minority protection in the following. The term stands
for both sides of minority protection, i.e. the enforcement of anti-discrimination norms and the support of
minority rights. While the first serves to ensure that minorities are not treated different than other individuals,
the latter aims at supporting the maintenance of their distinct culture, language, etc. (cf. OSI 2001: 16).5
Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia will be taken under scrutiny.
3 Consid-
ering the very general formulation of the political criteria alongside the large
amount of states which the Commission’s evaluations cover, two problems are ap-
parent. The first obvious obstacle seems to be that of horizontal consistency across
the countries monitored. However, as will be illustrated in the cause of the paper,
this is not the predominant challenge the Commission faces in applying the Copen-
hagen criterion. More relevant is the second difficulty which lies at hand, namely
how to operationalise the criterion. Thus, the central starting point of the study
finds expression in a functional question, namely: How does the EU transpose the
very general criterion into measurable standards and benchmarks? The particular
relevance of this inquiry is amplified by the lack of a clear legal framework for the
protection of human rights within the Union itself, which could serve as a basis for
the assessment of external actors. Yet, if in certain cases the Commission has to
invoke standards that are not part and parcel of the European Union’s acquis
communautaire, what impact does this have on the scope and validity of the annual
assessments?
In the face of these questions, it is necessary to recapitulate the European Union's
access to minority protection and human rights in general and in its external pol-
icy, in particular in order to place the accession criteria in this context (Part I).
The proceeding part focuses on the Commission’s actual monitoring system by
giving a brief overview on the situation of the minority groups under perspective
and the focal points the European assessment formulated in response (Part II). Af-
ter this mainly illustrative section, the measures, which the candidate states took,
and the evaluations the Commission has given on these are being discussed (Part
III-IV). This aims at, finally, drawing some conclusions on the effects the elabo-
rated monitoring system really had with view to, on the one hand, the preparation
for accession, and on the other hand, to improve the actual situation of minorities
in general.   
                                                     
3 Identifying the most pressing problems, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR) defines three minority issues. These are: a) the situation of the Roma people throughout a number of
CEEC, most importantly in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania; b) the Russian speaking
minority in Estonia and Latvia and; c) the recognition of the Kurdish people in Turkey (Commission 1999 b:
3). With respect to the limited scope of the paper, the study will only focus on points a) and b). Yet, it needs
to be noted that the Regular Reports also deal with the situation of Roma in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.6
Part I
The Protection of Fundamental Rights within the European Union
The Original Treaties and the Role of the European Court of Justice
When the European Community was established in 1957, its main objective was
economic and not political integration, so it does not come as a surprise that the
original Treaties founding the Communities did not contain any reference to fun-
damental rights, apart from the freedom of movement, the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality, and the principle of equal pay between
men and women.
In the course of building the “common market”, however, the legal gap that existed
in this field became obvious, as individuals started to complain about Community
decisions that allegedly affected their fundamental rights as laid down in their na-
tional legislation or in international instruments for the protection of fundamental
rights. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) consequently had to react to this ap-
parent lack of protection of such rights at Community level, and since the late
1960s it played a key role in awarding European citizens protection against viola-
tions of their fundamental rights. The Court did so by declaring that respect for
fundamental rights “forms an integral part of the general principles of Community
law” and that they are therefore protected by the ECJ. In safeguarding these rights
the ECJ found inspiration in “the constitutional traditions of the Member States”
and “from the international treaties for the protection of human rights” of which the
Member States are signatories, amongst which “special importance” was attached to
the European Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.
The case law of the ECJ has greatly influenced the development and protection of
fundamental rights at the Community level, and raised the question of introducing
some kind of provision in the Treaties about respect for fundamental rights at
Community level that would reinforce and complement the jurisdictionally based
system created by the ECJ. Therefore, the Single European Act of 1986 already in-
cluded in its Preamble the Member States’ determination “to work together to pro-7
mote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognised in the constitu-
tions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of human
rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably free-
dom, equality and social justice”.
The Contribution of the Treaty of Maastricht to the Protection of Fundamental
Rights
It will not be until the Maastricht Treaty that we see a real step towards recognition
of the protection of fundamental rights within the Treaties. Its Preamble states the
attachment of the Union “to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”, while Articles J.1 and
K.1 referred to fundamental rights in the fields of Common Foreign and Security
Policy and Justice and Home Affairs respectively. Yet, the most relevant article in
this respect is Article F(2), which consecrates the jurisprudence of the ECJ by
stating that “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Free-
doms [...] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, as general principles of Community law”.
In addition to the explicit references to fundamental rights, the Treaty of Maastricht
introduced the concept of European citizenship, in order “to strengthen the protec-
tion of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States”.
4 This citizen-
ship confers on European citizens a certain number of political and civil rights,
namely the freedom of movement, the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at
the municipal elections in the Member State of residence, the right to vote and to
stand as a candidate for EP elections, the right to diplomatic and consular protec-
tion by any Member State in the territory of third countries, and the right of peti-
tion before the European Parliament.
5
The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Furthering of Non-discrimination Policies
The Amsterdam Treaty marked another step forward in the commitment of the
European Union to the protection of fundamental rights. The first paragraph of Ar-
ticle 6 (ex Article F) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) states that “the
                                                     
4 Article 2 TEU (ex Article B TEU).8
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States”, while paragraph 2 asserts: “the Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as gen-
eral principles of Community law”. Moreover, the European Court of Justice is en-
dowed with competence to ensure that the acts of the institutions are in compliance
with Article 6(2), “insofar as the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and under this Treaty”.
Besides, in Amsterdam a new Article 7 was included in the TEU, attaching new
consequences to the breach of fundamental rights by a Member State. This Article
allows the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment, to determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member
State of the principles contained in Article 6(1). To determine such a breach, the
Council acts by unanimity on a proposal of one third of the Member States or of the
Commission, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. Once the
breach is determined, the Council can decide by qualified majority to suspend cer-
tain rights given to the Member State in question by virtue of the Treaty, including
the right to vote in the Council. The Nice Treaty re-formulates Article 7 so that the
Council can determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member
State of the principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and address recommendations to
that a Member State in order to solve the critical situation before an actual breach
of the principles takes place. The initiative for such a decision can come from one
third of the Member States, the Commission or the European Parliament.
A further important change was introduced in Article 49 (ex Art. O), which de-
clares the respect for the principles set out in article 6(1) a precondition for apply-
ing for EU membership. Therefore, since the Amsterdam Treaty, the respect for
fundamental rights is a legal condition of membership.
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 See Articles 17 to 22 of the TEC (ex Article 8 TEC).9
Last but not least, the Amsterdam Treaty also strengthened the clause of non-
discrimination, Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(TEC), thereby empowering the Council to take action to combat discrimination
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual ori-
entation.
6 According to the wording of Article 13, “the Council, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament,
may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”.
Following this provision, the European Community (EC) produced two directives in
the year 2000, namely Directive 2000/43/EC
7 on the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial for ethnic origin of 29 June 2000 and Direc-
tive 2000/78/ECE 
8 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation.
9 To complement the two Directives, a Community Action
Programme
10 for the years 2000-2006 was approved, in order to support projects
aimed at preventing and combating discrimination on all the grounds listed in Arti-
cle 13.
11
Directive 2000/43/EC, the so-called Race Directive, sets out a binding framework
for the prohibition of racial discrimination throughout the EU. It applies a very ex-
tensive interpretation of discrimination, since it prohibits direct and indirect dis-
crimination but also racial “harassment”.
12 The directive applies to “all persons”, so
also to nationals of third countries, and it applies both to natural and legal persons.
Moreover, it outlaws discrimination in the areas of employment, social protection,
social advantages, education and access to the supply of goods and services. Per-
                                                     
6  It should be noted that Article 13 does not include “language” among the grounds on which discrimi-
nation is prohibited.
7  OJ L180, 19.07.2000, pp. 0022-0026.
8  OJ L303, 02.12.2000, pp. 0016-0022.
9  This Directive only refers to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and
sexual orientation with regards to employment and occupation, since discrimination on grounds of sex is al-
ready object of EC secondary legislation on the basis of Article 141 TEC.
10  Council Decision of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community action programme to combat dis-
crimination (2001 to 2006), OJ L 303, 02.12.2000, pp. 0023-0028.
11  This accounts except for discrimination on the grounds of sex which is dealt with by a specific Com-
munity Action.
12  According to Article 2(3) of the Directive, harassment will be deemed to be discrimination “when an
unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin takes place with purpose of or effect of violating the dig-
nity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.10
sons who believe themselves to be victims of discrimination are granted access to
administrative or judicial procedures to defend their rights, empowering the victims
to also seek support by external organisations in the proceedings. The Directive
shifts the burden of proof to the respondents if the defendant can provide evidence
that set the presumption that there has been discrimination. It foresees mechanisms
to sanction those who discriminate. Finally, the Race Directive requires from Mem-
ber States to designate a body for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons
without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
The Employment Directive (Directive 2000/78/EC) prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. It uses the same
approach as the Race Directive (prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination,
shift of the burden of proof, positive action, etc.) but its scope is limited to the area
of employment.
As a part of the acquis communautaire this legislation is also subject of the acces-
sion negotiations with the candidate countries and must be fully implemented by
them. As will be elaborated on below, despite the essential upgrading of human
rights issues by the introduction of anti-discrimination acquis in Amsterdam and
the further advances reached with the Council Directives, it may however be ques-
tioned whether this EU legislation covers minority rights adequately and suffi-
ciently.
Nice and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
In December 2000, the Heads of State and Government signed the Treaty of Nice
incorporating the reforms that would provide the EU with the institutional capaci-
ties to face enlargement. Two amendments have relevance in what concerns the cur-
rent system of protection and promotion of fundamental rights. The first one is the
already mentioned re-formulation of Article 7 TEU, which provides for the possi-
bility to take action when there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the principles
of article 6(2). Under Article 46 TEU, the ECJ will be competent only for disputes
concerning procedural provisions under Art. 7 and not for the appreciation of the
justification of the appropriateness of the decision taken under Art. 7.11
The second amendment relates to Article 181 TEC on economic, financial and
technical cooperation with third countries, according to which Community policy in
this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating
democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Further to the Treaty changes in Nice, an event that developed in parallel to the
reform of the Treaties is of paramount importance for the issue of fundamental
rights. Indeed, Nice saw the proclamation of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.
13 The Charter was the outcome of a process initiated by the
Heads of State and Government in the European Council of Cologne in 1999, where
they acknowledged the need to make the importance and relevance of fundamental
rights more visible to the Union’s citizens.
14 The Charter consists of 7 Chapters and
54 Articles, and it is mainly meant to be a codification of previously existing rights
that were scattered in different instruments and were therefore not obvious for the
general public. The rights and principles included in the Charter must be respected
by the EU and by the Member States when applying Community law. The Charter is
a political declaration, and it was not endorsed legally binding status, neither was it
included in the Treaties. However, although not directly justiciable, the legitimacy
of the process through which it was drafted, and the solemnity of its proclamation
have made of the Charter a very important reference document.
15 Besides, the status
of the Charter and its inclusion in the Treaties is one of the issues listed in the
Declaration on the Future of the Union annexed to the Treaty of Nice as a subject
for debate in the preparations for the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
which will take place in 2004. Working Group II of the Convention on the debate
on the future of Europe, chaired by Commissioner Vitorino, has the mandate to
look into the modalities and consequences of the incorporation of the EU Charter of
                                                     
13  The EU Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Commission on 07.12.2000; cf. OJ C364, 18.12.2000, p. 1-22.
14  European Council Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Presi-
dency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999.
15  For instance, the Advocates-General are making an increased number of references to the Charter in
their Opinions; the European Court of First Instance has used it already as a guidance (see T-54/99, Max.Mob;
or T-177/01, Jegó-Quéré); the EP and the European Ombudsman are receiving and deciding on petitions and
complaints from citizens that refer to the Charter; the Commission issued a Communication in which it ex-
pressed its determination to regards the Charter as binding upon itself (see Commission Communication, Ap-
plication de la Charter, SEC(2001), 13 March 2001); several acts adopted under the co-decision procedure
have also made references to the Charter.12
Fundamental Rights into the Treaties. Although the final decision will lay on the
Heads of State and Government in the context of the IGC 2004, we can already
draw some conclusions of what the outcome may be from the final report of the
Working Group.
16 According to the report, the members of the group either strongly
supported or would not rule out giving favourable consideration to the incorpora-
tion of the Charter into the envisaged “Constitutional Treaty”, whether through the
insertion of the Charter articles into the Treaty, or by including a reference to the
Charter in one of the articles of the Treaty (combined with annexing the Charter to
the Treaty as a specific part of the Charter or as a Protocol).
17 In the same line, the
European Parliament’s report on the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the EU and its future status advocates for an increased status of the Charter, spe-
cially in the context of enlargement, because “it will serve to enshrine a funda-
mental rights regime at the heart of the European integration process thereby reas-
suring old, new and potential Member States alike”.
18
With regards to the issue of this study, minority protection, three Articles of the
Charter are of relevance:
-  First, Article 20 affirms equality before law of all people.
-  Secondly, Article 21 states the principle of non-discrimination, enumerating 18
grounds among which non-discrimination based on the membership of a national
minority is included.
19 The wording of this Article is based partly in Article 13
TEC, and partly in Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
20 Although at first glance it
may look as if this Article “expands” the competence of the European Commu-
nity to tackle discrimination to those grounds which are not included in Article
13 TEC, the Charter makes it explicitly clear that it does not establish any new
powers or tasks for the Community or Union.
21 Besides, the Charter also estab-
lishes that those rights recognised in the Charter which are based on the Treaties
                                                     
16 Final report of Working Group II, CONV 354/02, 22.10.2002.
17  At the date of drafting this study, the report still needs to be discussed in the Plenary.
18  European Parliament’s Report on the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union and its future status, A5-0332/2002, 08.10.2002.
19  The list of grounds on which discrimination is prohibited is merely illustrative.
20  However, the ECHR also includes “association with a national minority” as one of the grounds on
which discrimination is prohibited. On the other hand, the grounds related to genetic heritage are based on
Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
21  Article 51(2) of the Charter states that “this Charter does not establish any new power or task for the
Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties”.13
shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by the
Treaties, while those based on the ECHR shall have the same meaning and scope
that is provided for in the Convention. Therefore, the EC can only take action
on those grounds that are expressly listed in Article 13 TCE, and has no com-
petence to enact anti-discriminatory legislation on the ground of membership of
a national minority.
-  Thirdly, Article 22 requests the Union to respect cultural, religious and linguis-
tic diversity. This article is based on Articles 6 TEC and 151 TEU and does not
add any further elements to these.
Summarising the findings reached so far, we can conclude that having started off as
primarily economic entity the EC/EU has extended its legal framework on funda-
mental rights and freedoms constantly over the years. Yet, even the latest advances
in the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the Convention on a fu-
ture constitution fall short of explicit EU standards on minority protection. While
the legal framework to protect individuals inside the EU is from discrimination on
various grounds, the special issue of minorities remains neglected.
EU Standards for the Protection of Fundamental Rights EU’s External Policy
Having observed the situation of fundamental rights inside the EU, attention needs
to be drawn to the EU standards for the protection of fundamental rights outside the
Union. In the international framework, the EU has been working on the promotion
of human rights and fundamental freedoms outside its borders, basing its action
mainly in the general framework of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
22 Since the proclamation of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights, the Commission also takes external action in compliance
with the rights and principles contained in the Charter.
Looking at the Treaties, we find mentions to the promotion and/or respect of human
rights in two of the components of EU’s external action: Common Foreign and se-
curity Policy (CFSP) and development policy. Article 11(1) TEU includes among
                                                     
22  The EU also uses as reference documents the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN), and the main international and regional
instruments for the protection of human rights, including the European Convention on Human Rights (Council
of Europe).14
the objectives of the CFSP “safeguarding of the common values, fundamental inter-
ests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of
the United Nations Charter”, and the “development and consolidation of democracy
and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. With
regard to development cooperation, Article 177(2) TEC states that Community
policy in this area “shall contribute to the general objective of developing and con-
solidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms”. Thus, respect for fundamental rights is one of the ob-
jectives both of the CFSP and of development co-operation policies. In Nice a step
further was taken by extending the objective of promoting the respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms from development co-operation to all forms of co-
operation with third countries.
23
The main instrument the EU uses to carry out its external policy is the principle of
conditionality. Since the 1990s, the EC has been including a so-called human rights
clause in its bilateral and multilateral co-operation agreements with third parties.
This clause defines the respect for democratic principles and human rights as an
“essential element” of the agreements, making human rights the subject of common
interest, part of the political dialogue and an instrument for analysing various posi-
tive measures. An additional clause enables all parties, where necessary, to take
“restrictive measures in proportion” to the gravity of the offence. Specifically, any
serious and persistent human rights violations or any serious interruptions of demo-
cratic processes (i.e. “material breaches” of the agreement) can constitute grounds
for terminating the agreement or suspending its application in whole or in part. On
29 May 1995, pursuant to a Communication of the Commission on the inclusion of
the respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the
Community and third countries
24, the Council approved a standard formulation that
had henceforth to be included in all agreements between the Community and third
countries. This standardisation should ensure consistency in the wording and appli-
cation of these clauses. Recently, the emphasis has changed from a negative ap-
proach of human rights in external relations, merely confined to the insertion of
                                                     
23  Article 181a TEC as amended in Nice.
24  Communication of the Commission on the inclusion of the respect for democratic principles and hu-
man rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM(95)216 final.15
clauses in trade or association agreements prohibiting the violation of human
rights, to a more positive, pro-active approach promoting the democratisation of
institutions, strengthening the rule of law, creating civil society platforms, etc.
In the concrete case of enlargement, the EU has also established certain human
rights standards as precondition for EU accession. The combination of Articles 6(1)
and 49 TEU refer to the political preconditions for EU membership, while the Co-
penhagen Criteria require that prior to accession the candidate countries achieve
stability of institutions, guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the
respect for and the protection of minorities. Noteworthy is that such extra criteria
have been established for the first time in the history of EU enlargements. While
the states previous joining the Union were only expected to comply with the com-
mon acquis, the standards put down in Copenhagen could not be directly related to
the acquis communautaire. This raises questions since the new approach the EU has
taken in the ongoing pre-accession process obviously sets new standards which are
neither fully reflected in its legal framework nor in its classical enlargement policy.
Shortcomings in EU external Action on Human Rights
Criticism has arisen regarding the external action of the EU in the field of human
rights:
1. In the first place, problems were identified regarding inconsistencies in the ex-
ternal action of the EU in its human rights policies. This applies, on the one hand,
to inconsistencies between EC policies, and between those and other forms of EU
action (especially CFSP) and, on the other hand, to inconsistencies between the ac-
tions of the EU and those of the Member States. In this regard, it is worth men-
tioning the previsions included in the Communication of the Commission on the
European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third
countries.
25 In this Communication the Commission stresses, among other things,
the need to promote a coherent and consistent approach to human rights policies
across pillars, and between those and the individual human rights policies of the
Member States; and the need to integrate human rights and democratisation into all16
EU external policies, so that these issues are included in the planning, design, im-
plementation and monitoring of policies and programmes, as well as in the political
dialogues with third countries.
2. These inconsistencies between the pillars and the different levels of EU govern-
ance are of general relevance. Yet, the criticisms which are of more direct impor-
tance to the content of this study refer to the inconsistency in the standards of hu-
man rights protection that the EU applies internally and externally, especially re-
garding the present candidate countries. Letting aside the situation of the candidate
countries, it needs to be highlighted that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
may become a useful instrument that could bring consistency and coherence be-
tween the internal and external dimensions of fundamental rights of the EU. At
least this seems to be the opinion of the Commission, which in its above mentioned
Communication on the EU’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in
third countries states that “the Commission’s action in the field of external rela-
tions will be guided by compliance with the rights and principles contained in the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights […], since this will promote coherence between
the EU’s internal and external approaches”.
Focusing on the case of enlargement, the imbalance between the requirements for
human rights protection that the EU imposes on candidate countries and the re-
quirements that the EU imposes on itself or on its Member States manifests in dif-
ferent ways.
These “double standards” seem apparent when we screen through the international
instruments on human rights that the candidate countries were asked to ratify as a
prerequisite for accession to the EU. It suffices to read the report of the European
Parliament for the year 2000 on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU
26 to
note that there are still shortcomings in the ratification by Member States of a
number of international instruments on protection of fundamental rights, some of
                                                                                                                                                                     
25  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European
Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries, COM(2001)252 final,
08.05.2001.
26  European Parliament’s report on the situation as regards fundamental rights in the European Union
(2000), A5-0223/2001.17
which are listed as instruments to be ratified by the candidate countries prior to
accession (cf. pp. 49).
Another example of these “double standards” is the fact that even though applicant
states have been asked to ratify the European Convention of Human Rights of the
Council of Europe, neither the EU nor the EC are signatories of the Convention. In
its Opinion 2/94
27, the ECJ ruled out the accession to the Convention, at least in the
present situation. The Court argued that accession would entail a substantial change
in the existing Community system for the protection of human rights, and the entry
of the Community into a distinct international institutional system. Such changes
would be of a constitutional significance that would go beyond the scope of article
235 (Article 308 after Amsterdam), and would therefore require the amendment of
the Treaties. Voices have been raised over the years calling for the accession of the
EU/EC to the ECHR. According to critics, accession would provide further protec-
tion to EU citizens’ rights since it would involve the submission of the ECJ to an
external monitoring system (the European Court of Human Rights) in the field of
fundamental rights. At the same time, accession would also send an unmistakable
message regarding the commitment of the EU towards the protection of fundamen-
tal rights, especially to the candidate countries. In the words of Alston and Weiler:
“It appears to be highly anomalous, indeed unacceptable, that whilst membership of
the Convention system is, appropriately, a prerequisite of accession to the Union,
the Union itself – or at least the Community – remains outside that system. The
negative symbolism is self-evident” (Alston/Weiler 1999: 30).
This problem may be solved in the context of the next IGC 2004. Indeed, Working
Group II of the Convention on the Future of Europe has the mandate to look not
only into the modalities and consequences of the incorporation of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights into the Treaties but also into the modalities and consequences
of possible accession of the EC/EU to the ECHR. According to the final report of
the Working Group
28, all members of the Group either strongly support or are ready
to give favourable consideration to the creation of a constitutional authorisation
                                                     
27  Opinion 2/94, 28.03.1996, Rec. 1996-I, p.1759.
28  Final report of Working Group II, CONV 354/02, 22.10.2002.18
enabling the Union to accede to the ECHR.
29 The view expressed in the report is
that accession to the ECHR:
-  would give a strong political signal of the coherence between the Union and the
“greater” Europe reflected in the Council of Europe and its pan-European hu-
man rights regime,
-  would give citizens an analogous protection vis-à-vis acts of the Union as they
presently enjoy vis-à-vis all the Member States; according to the report, this ap-
pears to be a question of credibility, given that Member States have transferred
substantial competences to the Union, and that adherence to the ECHR has been
made a condition for membership of new States in the Union,
-  would provide the ideal tool to ensure a harmonious development of the case
law of the two European Courts in human right matters.
This question will have to be discussed and agreed upon in the Plenary of the Con-
vention, and it of course remains to be seen what the decision of the Heads of State
and Government in the IGC 2004 will be.
3. Discrepancies between internal and external protection of fundamental rights are
moreover apparent regarding the scope for action to sanction a state for a breach of
fundamental rights. Serious human rights violations by a Member State can be
sanctioned according to Article 7 TEU. Yet, the options for monitoring as well as
sanctioning actions within the Union are vastly more limited than those referring to
third countries or to applicant states. Hence, there is a “potential scope of disparity
between the internal and external policies on human rights promotion” (Williams
2000: 616); or as Clapham puts it, the EU suffers from “inconsistency, inherent in
the CFSP, whereby the Union decries violations of human rights abroad yet has no
voice with regard to human rights problems at home” (1999: 639).
EU Enlargement and the Protection of Minorities: The Case for Improvement
The question of “double standards” between the EU’s internal and external human
rights policies becomes even more accentuated with regard to the protection of mi-
norities. Indeed, the issue of minority rights is an important item in the relationship
                                                     
29  Provided that the Union is given legal personality, issue that is being debated within Working Group
III of the Convention on the future of Europe.19
with candidate countries but it is broadly absent from the internal agenda of the
EU. As already mentioned along this chapter, the Copenhagen Criteria include the
respect and protection of minorities by candidate countries as a precondition for
accession. However, although the Amsterdam Treaty accommodated the Copenha-
gen Criteria in Article 6(1) TEU
30, the protection of minorities was not included
explicitly in that Article.
31 This omission also applies to Article 49 TEU as adapted
in Amsterdam, which only refers to the principles set out in Article 6(1) as a pre-
condition for applying for membership. In words of Bruno de Witte, “respect for
democracy, the rule of law and human rights have been recognised as fundamental
values in the European Union's internal development and for the purpose of its en-
largement, whereas minority protection is only mentioned in the latter context” (de
Witte 2000: 4; italics in original).
Indeed, the explicit mention of minority rights is a new element of EU human rights
policy that gained momentum for the very first time in the context of enlargement
to the East. In the pre-Maastricht period, the issue of minority protection was
mainly circumscribed to an interest of the European Parliament in the linguistic
heritage of minorities.
32 Maastricht’s contribution to the cause of minority protec-
tion was Article 128 TEC (Article 151 after Amsterdam), which “gave birth to the
concept of cultural diversity” (Toggenburg 2000: 25)
33 by expressing the intention
of the Community to contribute to the “flowering of the ‘cultures of the Member
States, while respecting their national and regional diversity’” (TEC Art. 151: 1,
quoted from Toggenburg 2000: 11).
34 Following this provision, EU’s institutions
have continuously highlighted the benefits of multiculturalism and diversity for and
within the Union.
                                                     
30  Indeed principles of Article 6(1) “are widely regarded as confirmation of the Copenhagen political
criteria within the text of the TEU” (Nowak 1999: 687-692).
31  “While in Copenhagen special emphasis was laid on the protection of minorities, this criterion was
not explicitly included in Article 6(1)”(Nowak 1999: 692).
32  Since the 1980s the EP has issued a number of resolutions dealing with minority languages and cul-
tures (cf. Toggenburg 2000).
33  For a more extensive analysis see Toggenburg (2000).
33  “Monitoring the EU Accession Process”, Open Society Institute, 2002.
34  The reform of Amsterdam added that when the Community takes action in any field of its compe-
tence, it will take cultural aspects into account “in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity
of its cultures” (Article 151 TEC).20
It was only the prospect of Eastern enlargement, and the particular political and
historical background of Central and Eastern European Countries regarding minori-
ties which put the issue on the EU´s agenda. The fact that minority protection is
mentioned as an independent issue in the Copenhagen criteria indicates therefore
that the EU did not consider it sufficient to make the protection of human rights
alone a precondition for accession.
While there was surely a need for the EU to address the serious shortcomings in
minority protection in the CEEC, an obvious contradiction was created by including
protection of minorities as a precondition for enlargement, whereas the EU has not
taken the appropriate steps to develop an equivalent requisite for its own Member
States. Indeed, the requirement to demonstrate “respect for and protection of mi-
norities” is not matched in internal documents binding upon Member States (OSI
2001 a). It is in fact difficult to find common standards on minority protection
within the EU framework. Admittedly, the principle of non-discrimination en-
shrined in Article 13 TEU and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as
the two Article 13 Directives already give some guidelines with regard to what
should be understood by “respect for minorities”. Thus, minority issues have been
incorporated into EC legislation through anti-discrimination provisions, but there is
no legislation dealing specifically with collective minority rights. The question is
then whether anti-discrimination is sufficient to ensure the respect for and protec-
tion of minorities (cf. Tsilevich 2001).
Undoubtedly, the Race Directive and the Employment Directive constitute a major
step in the furthering human rights protection. The prohibition in the two Directives
of both direct and indirect discrimination as well as of harassment and the incorpo-
ration of a definition of the three concepts constitutes a great improvement. Moreo-
ver, it is noticeable that the Race Directive goes beyond the restricted area of em-
ployment to cover other important areas such as social protection or education.
However, there are some shortcomings to the system created by the two Directives.
Of special relevance is the omission of references to religious discrimination in the
Race Directive, an aspect that is very often related to discrimination on the grounds
of racial or ethnic discrimination. The discrimination on the grounds of religion or21
belief is thus only covered by Directive 78/2000/EC, which is limited to the area of
employment. Moreover, the Directives do not cover incitement to racial hatred and
violence.
35 Besides, protection for a minority as a group is not guaranteed since
only individuals are allowed to take their complaints up to court. Of course, by en-
suring that individuals are not treated differently from others, anti-discrimination
legislation indirectly also covers the rights of minorities where its members are le-
gally disadvantaged as individuals.
It can then be argued that enacting anti-discrimination legislation is a first step, but
“insufficient in itself to address the spectrum of minority rights enshrined in mod-
ern human rights instruments. A more elaborated framework will be required to
ensure that the minority problems in Europe’s Eastern half don’t return to haunt the
enlarged Union of the future” (Tsilevich 2000).
Looking for EU standards on protection of minorities, it is also difficult to find a
common denominator in the legislations of the Member States. Indeed, there is not
a single approach to the issue of minorities in the legislation or in the constitutional
traditions of the Member States. Just as an example, France
36 and Greece do not
recognise the existence of minorities, and in the case of Germany only minorities of
German nationality are recognised.
Hence, apart from the benchmarks provided by the two Article 13 Directives, and
the general commitment to preserve cultural diversity reflected in Article 151 TEC,
when monitoring political accession criteria, the Commission has to make use of
further European and international instruments on minority protection. Instruments
such as the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities are then used by the Commission as source of reference under the
                                                     
35  However, a proposal of the Commission for a Council Framework Decision on combating Racism and
Xenophobia is currently being discussed (COM(2001)664 final, OJ C E/2002/75, p.269, 26.03.2002). The aim
of the Decision is the approximation of laws of the Member States and closer cooperation between judicial
and other authorities regarding offences related to racism and xenophobia. The Commission proposal explic-
itly refers to public incitement to violence or hatred for racist and xenophobic purposes as one of the offences
that Member States shall punish as a criminal offence. It remains to be seen the outcome of the discussions in
the Council. It is worth mentioning that from the preparatory documents in the Council it seems that the scope
of the definition of racism and xenophobia is more limited than that of the Commission proposal, which origi-
nally included religion or belief together with race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin. The last
documents of the Council only include these last grounds mentioned in the text above.22
Copenhagen monitoring mandate. Thus, the instruments the Commission applies to
monitor compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria are greater in number and wider
in scope than those it can use monitoring the present Member States. As a matter of
fact, for the latter only those aspects that are part of the acquis are subject to
monitoring and can be brought before the European Court of Justice. The asymme-
try is self-evident.
This is the more worrying when realised that the ratification record by the Member
States of the international instruments on protection of minorities is far from com-
plete. In particular, not all Member States have ratified the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)
37, or the European Charter of
Regional or Minority Languages.
38 This fact has been highlighted several times by
the European Parliament, mainly when issuing its reports on human rights. In its
annual Report on human rights in the world in 2001 and European Union Human
Rights Policy
, the Parliament reaffirms the defence of minority rights within the EU
and in the candidate countries as a major priority for the EU strategy for human
rights and democracy according to Article 13 of the Treaty. Besides, the report of
the EP for the year 2000 on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU decided to
follow the structure of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in its evaluation (cf.
pp. 11). Therefore, attention was devoted to analysis and recommendations in the
field of rights of national minorities. Attention was drawn to the above mentioned
lack of ratification by certain Member States of the European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities, to the need to “honour their special duty to the various national
minorities among the EU population” an give due weight to their (…) rights”, and
to the need to improve the situation of Roma/Sinti living within the EU.
There is therefore a need to articulate the standards for the protection of minority
rights within the EU – standards that should be clear, unconditional and apply to all
                                                                                                                                                                     
36  France does not recognise the existence of minorities arguing on the basis of the constitutional prin-
ciple of the indivisibility of the Republic and equality among citizens.
37  France has not signed the Convention; Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have not
ratified the Convention. Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Germany have ratified the Convention but entered
declarations limiting the potential beneficiaries of the FCNM.
38  Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have not signed the Charter; France, Italy, Luxembourg and
The Netherlands have not ratified the Charter yet.23
EU Member States, new and old. The danger of creating the perception of “double
standards” is in itself reason for the EU to search for more consistency in its ap-
proach to minority protection, in order to enhance the credibility of its external
conditionality policy (Amato/Batt 1998 a). But beyond the question of credibility
there is still another worrying aspect attached to this situation. The protection of
minorities is only a criterion monitored in the framework of the Copenhagen Crite-
ria, and since there is no EU binding legislation on the protection of minorities, the
question arises of what will happen beyond accession. If the EU does not create
standards regarding the respect for and protection of minorities applicable to its
Member States and sets up an adequate monitoring system for the compliance with
those standards, it may be the case that candidate countries “import” minority-
related problems into the Union without the latter having the appropriate means to
address them.
39 This, added to the growing migration flows arriving to the EU,
“will render inevitable the elaboration of a more concrete Union framework on mi-
nority rights” (Tsilevich 2001).
                                                     
39  In words of John Packer, Legal Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in
1999, “we have serious concerns that if there is not an EU internal (human rights) assessment process and if
there is not a continual annual reporting, new states which become EU members might feel less pressure to
meet those human right standards” (Report from the EU Human Rights Forum, 30.11-01.12.1999).24
Part II
Minorities in the Process of Enlargement
This section shall illustrate the subject matter of minority protection in the context
of enlargement by focusing on the questions: What is the situation minorities live
in? How is the EU's monitoring system structured? What are the focal points the
EU considers in its assessment?
The next three chapters are to give some answers to these inquiries. The first
one discusses the broad historical and regional context the Russian-speaking and
Roma minorities live in. It is followed by an outline of how the Commission con-
ducts its monitoring functions. Finally, the two issues are looked at together in an
examination of the Regular Reports' content, i.e. the major problems that minority
protection faces according to the findings of EU monitoring.
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe
Compared to Western European states, the proportion of minority population is
relatively higher in the CEEC. While the large Roma population in Central and
Eastern Europe is deeply rooted in history, the great number of Russian speakers
40
in Latvia and Estonia has its origin mainly in 50 years of USSR rule. During this
period mostly forced Soviet-migration changed the ethnic composition of all three
Baltic States substantially. Migration was not only promoted due to Soviet ideol-
ogy, which supported the creation of cosmopolitan societies, but as well as to pro-
vide for new labour force in industrialising parts of the Republic. “Baltic State
residents were particularly targeted as anti-Soviet, with the result that tens of thou-
sands of ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians emigrated from their native
countries. At the same time, incentives were given to Russians, Ukrainians, Georgi-
ans, and other groups to migrate to the Baltic States [...]. The result was that the
number of ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians dropped tremendously be-
tween 1934 and 1959 in their respective countries: 100,000 ethnic Estonians,
169,000 Latvians and 267,000 Lithuanians vanished from census data in 25 years”
                                                     
40 I will use the terms Russian-speaking minority or Russian speakers. Some documents and studies also
apply the term ethnic Russians which would be misleading in our context since the Russian speaking minority
which this study focuses on also includes members of Belarussian, Jewish, and Ukrainian minorities.25
(Gelazis 2000: 4-5).
41 Most people who migrated to the Baltic States were native
Russian speakers. The language, which belonging to the Slavic language family
differs notably from Latvian as a Germanic and Estonian as a Hung-Ugrian lan-
guage, served not only as basic administrative language but (together with member-
ship of the Communist party) also guaranteed a privileged status in society, e.g.
regarding access to higher education. Today, Russian speakers represent a substan-
tial percentage of the Estonian (14 percent) and Latvian population (29.4 percent).
The size of the diverse Roma populations
42, the biggest minority group in Central
and Eastern Europe, is much more difficult to estimate than that of the Baltic mi-
norities. As Marushiakova and Popov emphasise: “No one knows exactly how many
Gypsies currently live – and used to live – in Central and Eastern Europe. There are
no reliable statistical and demographic data for their distribution or their internal
subdivisions, only a significant amount of imprecise and fluctuating information”
(2001: 34). The lack of reliable data complicates a systematic monitoring of dis-
crimination. However, so far there is still “no consistent way of counting them:
methods include estimating from a count of number of caravans, self-identification
and the opinion of neighbours” (Kovats 2002: 2). Mostly due to the preference of
Romani people not to identify themselves as Roma when interrogated for official
data collection, it is estimated "that recent official statistical censuses generally
record only about one third of the real number of Gypsies in each country. [...] The
minimum number for the region based on national censuses is about 1,500,000
while the maximum estimate, if one includes those of Roma leaders, is around
6,300,000. One can summarise this complex and confusing picture by stating that
today, as in the past, the population of Gypsies varies considerably from country to
                                                     
41 Gelazis takes these figures from Lauristin, Marju/Vihalemm, Peeter (eds.) (1997): Return to the
Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition. Tartu: Tartu
University Press, pp. 305-506.
42 EU documents consequently apply the term Roma “as a generally accepted generic name for the
group of people who speak a Romani tongue and/or share a common ethnic identity, culture and history.
The term Gypsy and several variants of Tsigan are considered by many to be pejorative” (Commission 2002
b: 4). Pointing out that the term Roma only gained wider use after 1989/90, Marushiakova/Popov however
remark that the term Gypsies “is wider in scope” and allows to also “include the Gypsy communities who
are not Roma or who are considered ‘Gypsies’ by the surrounding but do not wish to be considered as such”
(2001: 52). A further difficulty of the term is that “[n]ot all those politically defined as Roma call them-
selves by this name; and some of those who do not, such as the German Sinti, outraged by what they per-
ceive as claims of superior authenticity by Valach Roma, even repudiate the appellation Roma” (Marushi-
akova/Popov 2001: 58). Nevertheless, since this study is focusing on the post-1989/90 era in Central and
Eastern Europe I will generally apply the Commission's terminology and use the term Roma – bearing in
mind the limitations of the term.26
country and the proportion they represent of the population as a whole also differs.
In some countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and possibly the Czech
Republic) Roma currently represent 5-10 per cent of the total population, while in
others (the countries of the former Soviet Union) they constitute less than 1 per
cent" (Marushiakova/Popov 2001: 34-35).
Although it is right that Roma represent the largest minority group in the
CEEC, Roma peoples do not constitute a uniform entity. On the contrary, the vari-
ous Romani groups are marked by great plurality.
43 Originating from the Indian
sub-continent, the first major migration waves of Roma people to Europe date back
to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. “These migrations produced a disperse
mosaic of peoples, united in common origins, culture and to some extent language,
but also distinguished by their diverse historical experiences and the resulting im-
pact on each group's culture” (OSCE 2000: 20). This plurality finds expression, on
the one hand, in differences between West European Gypsies and Central European
Roma and, on the other hand, within these groups themselves. Roma communities,
which use between 50 and 100 different dialects, neither have a common tongue nor
do they share the same lifestyles (Kovats 2002: 2). Another common but misleading
believe is to associate all Roma with nomadism since, as a matter of fact, Roma
have been stable residents in many CEEC for centuries (OSCE 2000: 20). Kovats
thus comes to the conclusion that “it is important to resist the inherent bias of the
Roma/Gypsy discourse, exemplified by the Council of Europe’s explicit proposal to
‘replace the socio-economic image by a cultural one’” (2002: 2) because there is no
such thing as one cultural Roma identity.
Looking at the post 1989/90 situation of Roma in the CEEC, the period of socialist
rule had, of course, certain effects on the present situation and can therefore not be
left out. The treatment of Roma under the diverse Communist regimes cannot be
generalised. Nevertheless, there are some recurring patterns across the countries.
While throughout earlier periods of Communist rule Roma received state support to
develop their cultural identity in some countries, in most cases “during later peri-
                                                     
43 For a more detailed illustration of the cultural and linguistic plurality amongst Romani/Gypsy groups
living in Central and Eastern Europe see Marushiakova/Popov 2001: 37, following. The authors also point to
the fact that these subgroups are faced with problems similar to other language minorities and that some of
them “such of the Rumungri in Central and Europe, have lost their language and traditional ethnic culture and
to a great extent even their Roma identity and nowadays many of them are poor and marginalized (ibid. 2001:
40).27
ods they were subjected to policies of forced assimilation” (OSCE 2000: 23). Ac-
cording to Communist ideology “[t]he general aim of Communist policy was to
make Gypsies equal citizens of their countries but successful equalisation was un-
derstood to mean the complete assimilation of Gypsies, so that they would swiftly
vanish as a distinct community” (Marushiakova/Popov 2001: 47). In retrospective it
is argued from many sides that Roma people were altogether better off before than
after the 1989-90 change of regimes. Guy e.g. asserts  that “[i]n summary, while
moribund assimilation policies of the Communists lapsed, they were replaced by
pandemic unemployment and destitution, verbal and physical racist attacks some-
times exalting to murderers and pogroms, increasing segregation in education and
housing, and widespread health problems aggravated by poverty” (2001: 13).
44 Rea-
sons for this may mainly be found in the changed economic context. The shift to
market economies meant that the demand for unskilled labour dropped dramati-
cally, a development that affected Roma most strongly. “After 1989 post-
Communist economic restructuring, involving the closure of outdated smokestack
industries and privatisation of collective farms, soon turned what had been sub-
stantial Roma employment levels into almost universal unemployment” (Guy 2001:
13).
Despite the fact that the two minorities presented here are marked by fundamental
differences, they have in common that they constitute a substantial proportion of
the population in countries they reside in. In consequence, approaches to find po-
litical solutions for central challenges concerning integration, discrimination and
the provision of minority rights entail comparable aspects. One example from the
institutional sphere is that the establishment of an official body to promote minor-
ity protection, say an Ombudsperson, is relevant for all applicant states. At legal
                                                     
44 Evaluating the meaning that Communist rule had for Roma, the opinions of various scholars differ
slightly. Interpreting longer than 40 years lasting Communist rule as an important feature, Mirga/Gheorghe
comment: “Most researchers and activists are in agreement that on balance, in spite many disadvantages, this
period was more beneficial for Roma than either what preceded it or came after. In the same way that the
incredible diversity of the Romani people is often oversimplified out of all recognition, so too is the crucial
period of state socialism. Communism is often seen as a colossal steamroller crushing Romani identity ruth-
lessly and yet, paradoxically and so grudgingly, it is admitted to have somehow improved the situation of
most Roma. [...E]xaminied in more detail, the monolithic face of Roma Policy under Communism fragments
in multiple faces” (Mirga/Gheorghe in Guy 2001: XVI, introduction). Steward, on the other hand, is more
critical on the effects of socialist policies on the lives of Roma when he states that “in the case of Gypsies
[m]any believe that because their position has by and large (though not universally) worsened since 1989,
Communism was for them ‘a good thing’. In reality this is no more true for them than for the other poor of
Eastern Europe. Indeed, crucial aspects of official policy towards Gypsies have left a demanding legacy of
forty years of social mis-management” (Steward 2001: 86).28
and constitutional level in particular broad similarities exist in the Commission’s
suggested changes which are derived from international standards or directly from
the EU framework. Furthermore, although national programmes or action plans dif-
fer according to country related specific features, the standards the Commission
applies in assessing the outline and functioning of a policy measure are set to com-
pare all states on the same footing. Moreover, minority policies of one state do not
only apply to one minority group.
45 As mentioned in the introduction, horizontal
consistency which ensures an equal judgement on all candidate states appears as an
area in which the assessment of minority protection could face substantial difficul-
ties. In order to explore how the Commission practically attempts to achieve con-
sistency of its assessments, we shall now turn to the question of how the EU pro-
ceeds when monitoring the application of minority protection.
Monitoring Human Rights in the Applicant States
How is the assessment of minority protection in the candidate states put into prac-
tice? With regard to the application of the political accession criteria, the Commis-
sion has established a set for formal procedures according to which regular moni-
toring is carried out. The first evaluation of the human rights situation in the appli-
cant states was published in July 1997 as part of the Agenda 2000. The Commis-
sion's Opinions were based on answers that the applicant states gave to a question-
naire designed by the Commission. The questionnaires were complemented by bi-
lateral follow-up meetings, reports purportedly provided by the relevant embassies
of the European Union's Member States, assessments from international organisa-
tions (including the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE)), and reports made by unidentified non-governmental
organisations (NGO) (Williams 2000: 608; Nowak 1999: 691).
The Regular Reports (or Progress Reports), which have succeeded the opin-
ions “have moved from being assessments of the state of the transition process and
the general compliance with the Copenhagen criteria to assessments of detailed
compliance based on the negotiating chapters. They can therefore be seen not only
                                                     
45 Apart from Roma there is a number of other relevant minorities in most candidate countries. Thus, a
substantial number of ethnic Turks live in Bulgaria, Romania hosts a large Hungarian minority, in the Czech
Republic there are a Slovak, Polish, German, Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities, and Slovakia has more than
ten recognised minorities. However, since the integration of these minorities is generally more advanced,
issues connected to other than the Roma minority find occasional mentioning in the reports but are not a major
issue in the Regular Reports.29
as part of the verification process for the negotiations but also as part of the condi-
tionality assessment linked to the available financial instruments” (Mayhew 2000:
10). The information used for the reports is provided by the candidate countries
themselves, the Member States and Commission representations in the states, by
Member State officials seconded through EU programmes to work in the admini-
strations of the candidate countries, and any additional material provided by non-
state actors, e.g. Non Governmental Organisations.
Since 1998 the Regular Reports are complemented by Accession Partner-
ships (AP) that define particular priorities for each applicant state – amongst others
concerning the political criteria. Accordingly, the Accession Partnerships for Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania made the further integration of
Roma a medium-term political priority, while Slovakia's partnership agreement laid
down that the country was to strengthen the policies and institutions protecting the
rights of minorities as a medium-term political priority. Based on the findings of
the Regular Reports, the first Accession Partnerships of 1998 were revised in 1999,
and a second time in 2002. The improvement of the situation of the Roma minority
gained further momentum in these updates “through the implementation of the na-
tional action or framework programmes [which are] a political priority in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia” (Commission 2002 b: 6).
The Formal Drafting Process
46
Given this framework for Commission’s reports on the enlargement process: how
does the assessment proceed? From the collection of information to the final adop-
tion of the Regular Reports the EU assessment involves a multitude of actors over a
lengthy process. Before the actual drafting begins, the Commission is involved in
an intensive period of gathering information of all different kinds. Information in-
cluded in the Regular Reports is drawn from a wider range of sources. The reports
generally refrain from quoting from any source, facts are never to be taken directly
from another document but undergo a process of crosschecks with other sources.
The material used can be classified into four broad groups, namely informa-
tion provided by: the states monitored, the Commission’s delegations, various in-
ternational organisations, and non-governmental organisations. First, the applicant
                                                     
46 This and the following section are based on an interview conducted with an official of DG Enlarge-
ment of the European Commission on 3 July 2002.30
states directly give the Commission their view on the relevant issues the Regular
Reports deal with. Another source of information is the contributions which the
Commission delegations prepare. The delegation papers serve as a first preparatory
draft of the reports. They are based on the monitoring a particular delegation has
been carrying out throughout the preceding year and include the findings of
monthly reports which consider such different references as news items, confer-
ences or expert interviews. Before drafting the preparatory reports for the Commis-
sion, meetings with the most relevant national actors are held, i.e. the national
ministries, NGOs and social partners.
Apart from the material provided by the delegations and the candidate coun-
tries themselves, the main international organisations dealing with Human Rights in
the European region, namely the Council of Europe and the OSCE, are central
sources of information for the Commission. In fact, in the field of minority rights
the co-operation between the Commission, the Council of Europe and the OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minorities is very close. Part of the preparatory
phase are meetings between the Commission and these bodies. Although, in princi-
ple, there is no hierarchy in the use of different sources, documents of the interna-
tional organisations have a slightly different status than, for instance, academic
publications or reports issued by NGOs. This is also reflected by the fact that the
Regular reports occasionally refer directly to opinions, recommendations or as-
sessments of these bodies.
47 The special authority of information provided by the
Council of Europe and the OSCE derives from the fact that all EU Member States
and applicant countries appertain to these institutions. Moreover, OSCE documents
are passed by consensus only.
The fourth class of information is drawn from NGOs. Like for other material,
standard double or triple checking is essential to the Commission. Moreover, in-
formation must be always confirmed in more than one additional source. Alongside
crosschecks with material of other external actors, the Commission delegations play
                                                     
47 The Council of Europe’s national reports on compliance with the Framework Convention for National
Minorities, including the evaluations by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, are a matter in
all 2002 Regular Reports (except for Latvia which still has not signed the Convention) (cf. RR 2002; also RR
2001 CZ). The OSCE is usually mentioned concerning recommendations it has made for certain aspects, e.g.
on language or election laws, in certain countries (RR 1998, 1999 EE; RR 1999-2001 LV; RR 1998 SK). Two
other institutions the Commission occasionally refers to in the Regular Reports are the United Nations Human
Rights Committee (see e.g. RR 2001 LV; RR 2002 CZ) and the European Court of Human Rights (see e.g. RR
1999 BU; RR 2002 LV).31
an important role in verifying information. Exclusively the Commission verifies
facts on human rights issues.
Verifying information is a time-consuming and complex task. While moni-
toring legal provisions is less complicated (review of existing legal framework),
checking on the implementation of policies as well as monitoring the existence, and
especially the functioning of institutions, is a much more difficult undertaking.
According to the Commission, its very prudent approach has so far prevented
any serious complaints on the content of the Regular Reports by the applicant
countries. It has however also raised criticism, especially by NGOs, that the posi-
tions the Commission takes in its reports are too lax.
After the collection of information has been completed, the country desks of the
respective country teams in DG Enlargement prepare a first draft of the reports.
These drafts undergo an extensive process of reading, discussion, rewriting and re-
reading by DG Enlargement's horizontal unit and the country desks, closely in-
volving the Commission's legal service. In this process, the role of the horizontal
unit is not only to ensure consistency between the Regular Reports over the years,
i.e. to ensure that facts taken up in previous reports are followed up adequately.
The equal treatment of the applicant countries is also a priority, and horizontal co-
ordination is to ensure that the same facts are mentioned and judged in the same
manner across all applicant states.
Before the adoption of the reports, the Commission informs each candidate
country of its main findings and conclusions, without however providing a paper
version of the drafts, and without entering into a discussion of these findings and
conclusions. However, the Commission's unwritten presentation summarising the
envisaged content of the Regular Reports gives the applicant states the chance to
submit comments and to provide the Commission with further factual information
where they feel this is needed. On this basis, further refinements are implemented
during the last weeks before the adoption of the Regular Reports in October. Pre-
ceding the final adoption by the College, the reports have to undergo further read-
ing by the Commission's cabinets, the collaborators of the Commissioners and the
Commissioners themselves.32
Manuals and Guidelines
To ensure consistency of the Regular Reports over the years and across the states
monitored, the Commission has established a methodology on how to apply the Co-
penhagen criteria. The methodology for drafting Regular Reports was developed by
the Commission when writing its opinions on the applicant states. Established in
1997, the then elaborated guidelines have been refined over the years, although no
far-reaching changes have occurred. The rules of procedure for drafting a report are
summarised in an internal handbook. This comprehensive document is used at all
levels of the DG Enlargement which are involved in the drafting process, as well as
by the delegations. It describes which sources should be consulted, how horizontal
co-ordination of texts should be implemented, and outlines how the involvement of
major international organisations must be taken into consideration. Apart from this,
the handbook includes specific checklists. These lists define how the key element
for the EC's assessment – i.e. the Copenhagen criteria – is to be operationalised by
outlining the facts that need to be examined. The checklist dealing with issues of
minority protection relates to certain major international instruments. Accordingly,
the Commission refers to the standards and benchmarks set by the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1948) and the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995). Considering
the European standards established by these instruments, the check-list states that
the following issues are to be included in a Regular Report: ratification of major
international conventions, introduction of anti-discrimination legislation, estab-
lishment and functioning of an ombudsman office with general competencies, the
application of human/civil and political rights and special minority rights, as well
as an account of the specific situation in the countries (e.g. the situation of Roma,
Russian speakers).
Focal Points of the Regular Reports
Minority protection is commonly subdivided into two major areas, namely the pro-
tection from discrimination and the promotion of Minority rights.
48 These two cate-
gories are strongly interwoven and often affect the same policy fields. For instance,
education policies are discriminatory if children of a certain group suffer from seg-
regation. On the other hand, state support to establish a university that teaches in a33
minority language regards the promotion of minority rights. The focal points of the
Regular Reports will be summarised in this section according to those subject areas
the assessments concentrate on.
49 Both aspects of minority protection are relevant
indicators in each field because under the Copenhagen criterion the Commission
has the mandate to monitor the two, anti-discrimination and minority rights.
50
The Regular Reports have thus established a specific set of issues over the
years and across the states which highlight infringements of minority protection
relevant to the Copenhagen criteria. The emphasis on specific topics differs par-
tially from aspects which are generally considered when minority protection is dis-
cussed in other contexts. One example is the problem of stateless children, which is
a central matter of concern because of the specific situation in the Baltic States.
To provide further insight into more general questions, the next subchapter will
begin with a discussion on some problems of discrimination and minority rights.
The then following parts will focus on the various policy fields that affect minority
protection.
Protection from Discrimination and Provision of Minority Rights
In a Staff Working Document on the European Initiative of Democracy and Human
Rights, the Commission outlines the main issues related to minority protection as
such:
“All continents, and the vast majority of modern states, host minority populations. Europe itself is home to
about a hundred national minorities. Minority rights are often not fully respected. The most common prob-
lems encountered are racism from the majority population; discriminatory treatment from institutions, par-
ticularly at the local level; educational and cultural disadvantage; and unsatisfactory level of participation in
decision-making and economic prosperity. Some communities, like the Roma, even experience social and
economic exclusion. Minorities issues can entail a threat to peace and stability when they translate into na-
tionalistic tendencies, or when peaceful coexistence with the mainstream population, or between different
minorities, can no longer be ensured” (Commission 2001 b: 37-38).
Widespread discriminative attitudes against minorities are a fundamental problem
that affects societies and public services, but also governments. If discrimination is
                                                                                                                                                                     
48 In this division the study follows the approach by the Open Society Institute (OSI: 2001).
49 Where it is considered to add important information on the subject matters of this chapter, further
literature other than EU publications is being referred to in footnotes.
50  It must be noted that the following does not claim to give full accounts of the present situation in
each one of the applicant states. Rather, in order to provide an overview on how the Regular Reports define
certain topics and which issues the reports identify as central, examples from different reports are referred to.
Accordingly, some of the cases quoted below refer to a certain situation in a state at one point of the moni-
toring period that might have changed later in the pre-accession process.34
deeply entrenched and formalised in institutional, social and governmental behav-
iour, one speaks of institutionalised discrimination.
Anti-Roma sentiments have been deeply rooted in society over the centuries. To
encourage a change in attitude and to break with discriminative traditions in legis-
lation and official conduct is a particularly complex task. As the OSCE High Com-
missioner on National Minorities asserts, only during the very last part of the
twentieth century concerted European efforts were made to address the individual
and cumulative effects of history. In his monitoring report on the situation of Roma
and Sinti he concludes: “[w]hile good will coupled with some effective initiatives
can be observed on the part of certain authorities in some [OSCE] States, the over-
all picture remains one of the extreme alienation of a Europe-wide under-class”
(OSCE 2000: 24).
With regard to the situation of Roma, some Regular Reports elaborate on
discrimination in society and misconduct of state institutions (foremost the police
but also the judiciary, cf. RR BU, CZ, HU, RO, SK). Unlike this, the reports for the
Baltic States focus on discrimination only in connection to certain areas (most im-
portantly access to citizenship). Moreover, the 2001 reports mention developments
in the adoption of EU anti-discrimination legislation.
Discrimination affects all areas of social life: education, employment, housing and
access to public services such as health care. It finds further expression in, for ex-
ample, political representation and the media. Discrimination and social exclusion
are one source of high levels of illiteracy, unemployment, poverty and, connected
to these factors, commonly low living-conditions. While the imperfect protection of
minorities in various fields of life is stated with view to almost all CEEC, the
stronger term “social exclusion” is used only in the Regular Reports on Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But one example is the 2001 report on Slovakia,
which explains that poor schooling, housing and high unemployment “have largely
contributed to a situation which deepens further social exclusion”.
The most extreme form of anti-minority behaviour is racially motivated violence.
Racially motivated violence conflicts with the right to respect of physical integrity,35
which includes in some circumstances the rights to security of person and life.
51
The Regular Reports comment in several cases on racial violence by individuals or
state institutions, which, in the worst case, is institutionalised. Thus, the 1999
Regular Report on Romania refers to “anecdotal evidence [... of] police brutality,
prejudice, racist harassment and violence” which is however difficult to quantify.
For Slovakia the 1999 and 2000 reports refer to “violence at the hands of thugs
(‘skinheads’) and lack of protection from the police”. The issue is taken up again in
the report in 2001: “Violence, notably at the hands of ‘skinheads’, continued to be
a serious threat to this [the Roma, EGH] minority. In 2000, the police recorded 35
cases of racially motivated crimes, with Roma being the biggest group of victims.
In some cases, Roma were exposed to serious ill-treatment by the police”.
Moving to the topic of minority rights, monitoring concentrates on specific free-
doms that individuals or communities are to be granted by state and society. Ac-
cording to international standards, minority rights cover the choice of identity, the
use of minority languages in the public and private spheres, minority education, the
access to media, and the effective participation in public life (cf. OSI 2001: 17). Of
these issues the use of minority languages is mainly discussed in the Regular Re-
ports on Estonia and Latvia. Certain aspects of minority rights in the field of edu-
cation also appear in the context of bilingual universities (Romania) and the teach-
ing in and of minority languages, culture and history at schools. For example, the
1998 report on Slovakia notes positively that parliament had rejected an amendment
to the Education Act, “which could have discriminated against ethnic minorities by
prohibiting the teaching of subjects such as geography and history in languages
other than Slovak”, while the 2000 report elaborates that the “efforts to provide
teachers with training about Romani culture and history have nevertheless been
strengthened and the first textbook on Roma history has been made available to
schools”. Similar statements can be found in the reports for all CEEC with a sub-
stantial proportion of pupils from a minority background.
Political participation and the access to media are less prominent topics in
the Regular Reports. Especially the latter is only mentioned in few assessments.
                                                     
51 These rights are laid down by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Art 3), the In-
ternational Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, see at: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last accessed 26 April 2001) (Arts. 6(1), 7, 9(1)) and the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Arts. 2 and 3; cf. OSI 2001: 17).36
The following sections will elaborate on the issues raised in order to provide a
more detailed look at the single aspects of both minority rights and anti-
discrimination.
Citizenship
The discussion of citizenship can be differentiated into, on the one hand, the at-
tachment of certain rights to citizenship and, on the other hand, the access to citi-
zenship in general. While access to citizenship is a prominent issue in the Regular
Reports, the former matter is basically left out and only mentioned in some singular
cases, for instance in connection with non-citizens passports that disqualify the
owner of certain fundamental rights (RR 1998, 1999 LV). Further, Estonia intro-
duced regulations that connect minority rights to citizenship when ratifying the
FCNM, although the Regular Reports refrain from going into this subject matter.
52
One explanation for this is that Austria and Germany also reserve the official mi-
nority status to citizens only, and the Commission would hence run danger to act
inconsistently if commenting on Estonian laws while having no say on regulations
of EU Member States. Moreover, other EU Member States, for instance France and
Greece, have not even ratified the FCNM and their national constitutions do not
recognise the existence of minorities (cf. above p. 22).
53
Although contradicting international human rights, the impact of non-citizenship
often implies far more than the exclusion from political participation, and can mean
exclusion from employment, health-care or other social services.
54 Moreover, in the
economic sphere integration of minorities can be limited if non-citizens are not al-
lowed to practise some professions on the grounds of state security, as for example
in Latvia, where non-citizens are prohibited to become lawyers, armed security
guards or private detectives (RR 1999 LV).
55
                                                     
52 The OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities officially exhorted to bind minority rights to
citizenship (OSCE 2000).
53 For more details on this see OSI (2001: 50).
54 The OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities reckons that the “most extreme form of politi-
cal exclusion is, of course, denial of citizenship” (OSCE 2000: 156), a judgement that alludes to the fact that
the denial of citizenship entails the exclusion from the full amount of citizenship rights.
55 Additionally, after accession only persons holing a national citizenship will gain EU-citizenship since
according to Article B of the Common Provisions, Title I (Treaty on European Union) EU citizenship applies
to the nationals of the Union’s Member States.37
Access to citizenship for Russian-speakers is the most prominent topic of the Esto-
nian and Latvian Regular Reports.
56 Central obstacles that the reports continuously
remark on are shortcomings in providing adequate citizenship laws and naturalisa-
tion procedures which include civic and language tests. The reports note several
improvements and have, in the last years, certified the states to meet the recom-
mendations by the OSCE in the area of citizenship and naturalisation (RR 2000 EE;
RR 1999 LV). However, the need for better information about how to gain citizen-
ship remained a prominent issue in the reports. Apart from the Baltics, changes of
the citizenship law allowing easier access to citizenship for Roma people were only
a subject in the 1999 report on the Czech Republic.
A special case related to the problem of citizenship is that of stateless children.
Even though Estonia and Latvia changed the relevant laws to that end that children
born in the country are granted citizenship by birth, the numbers of naturalisation
of stateless children remained relatively low. The reports explain this mainly with
the wish of parents to naturalise at the same time as their children (cf. RR 1999-
2001 EE, LV).
Language Regulations
Another area on which the Regular Reports on Estonia and Latvia put great empha-
sis is language regulations. The legal framework for the use of minority languages
touches on many others issues, such as citizenship, education, media, and political
participation, but also economic questions including employment and business
laws. In the latter context most attention is being paid to regulations that limit the
freedom of expression and economic liberty. The seriousness of intended or actu-
ally introduced amendments to language regulations becomes evident in that the
reports explicitly refer to Estonia's and Latvia's obligations under international in-
struments and the Europe Agreements.
57
                                                     
56 Considering the great number of minority population in the Baltic states, problems arise since
“[i]nstead of offering a ‘zero-option’ formula, like all other states on the territory of the former Soviet Union
did, the Estonian and Latvian Governments restricted automatic citizenship to those who had held it before the
Soviet occupation and their direct descendants” (Zaagman 1999: 23).
57 With regard to language regulations, the Open Society Institutes hints to shortcomings of the EU
anti-discrimination acquis: “Notably, the Directive does not prohibit discrimination on the grounds of lan-
guage, an issue of particular relevance to Estonia and Latvia. Russian-speaking minorities who seek
authority for claims of language discrimination must look to non-EU instruments, including Article 14 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil38
Moreover, some language regulations prescribe a certain level of proficiency
for the participation in the national economy or even introduce government agen-
cies to control the use of language in the private sector (cf. RR 1998 EE)
58. In these
cases, the Regular Reports express the concern that rights guaranteed to EU-
citizens by the Europe Agreements are affected. For instance, referring to the
“rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Europe Agreement [which include e.g.]
the exercise of business activities for enterprises from the European Union” the
1999 report on Latvia comments: “A liberal attitude will also be particularly im-
portant with a view to Latvia’s accession to the European Union. In particular, once
Latvia becomes a Member State of the European Union, any European Union na-
tional or company would be able to invoke the principle of the prohibition of any
discrimination on the grounds of nationality to challenge the application of the na-
tional legislation in practical cases”. Employees in the public administration (for
example, nurses, police and prison officials) are generally required to show at least
a minimum level of proficiency in Estonian, respectively Latvian.
59 Concerning the
use of language in the public sphere, regulations can be quite far-reaching. An ex-
ample is stated by an Estonian law which “makes it a legal offence for signs ad-
dressed to the public not to be in Estonian language” (RR 2002 EE), a regulation
which according to the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention of Na-
tional Minorities is not in line with the Convention and is thus criticised in the
Regular Report.
Furthermore, the reports make a special comment on the application of lan-
guage laws. According to the Commission the states “should ensure that in the im-
plementation of this regulation the principles of proportionality and justified public
interest are properly respected” (RR 2001 EE) – the reports on Latvia state the
same. This remark concerns however not only the application of relevant laws in
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), both of which expressly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of lan-
guage” (OSI 2001).
58 The 1999 report discusses proposed amendments to the Estonian Language Law which, if introduced,
would have established strict language regulations for the private sector. “The most controversial provision of
the amendments to the law is that the employees of business associations, NGOs and foundations and physical
persons as entrepreneurs (self-employed) must use the Estonian language for offering goods and services
while performing their work. The Estonian language requirements will not be applied to those foreign experts
who have arrived in Estonia on the basis of a work permit for a period of up to a year. [...] The application of
the law in the public sector could have considerable impact in some groups of public workers such as prison
officials, of which around 40% are non-Estonian citizens and have a relatively low command of the Estonian
language” (RR 1999 EE).
59 The 2002 report on Estonia contains a detailed paragraph on the work of the so-called Language
Inspectorate, the official body supervising adhesion to language regulations in the public and private sector,
and raises a fair amount of recommendations similar to the examples quoted here.39
the economic sphere but it also points explicitly to election laws. In this field,
regulations which lay down language requirements for candidates to parliamentary
and local elections are continuously at issue, as well as the ban of electoral posters
that make use of a language other than the official one (cf. RR 1999 EE).
By introducing language regulations that aim to enhance political participation, a
number of candidate states have promoted minority rights. Thus, in Romania in lo-
calities where more than 20 per cent of the population belongs to a minority, mem-
bers of that minority have the right to receive services from local authorities in
their mother tongue; moreover the agenda and decisions of the local council are to
be made public in the relevant minority language (RR 1999, 2002 RO). A similar
Slovak law provides that persons belonging to a minority are able to use their lan-
guage in official communications with public administrative institutions and in or-
gans of local self-administration where the minority population accounts to at least
20 percent (RR 1999 SK). “The Ministry of the Interior has established the list of
656 municipalities where the Law on the Use of Minority Languages in Official
Communications applies (i.e. where national minorities – Hungarian, Ruthenian,
Roma, Ukrainian and German – represent at least 20% of the population) and has
issued guidelines. Some local authorities have also developed implementing regu-
lations” (RR 2000 SK). Yet, the report objects that in many areas minorities do not
make use of this special right due to a lack of information. “For instance, no Roma
village has apparently taken advantage of the possibilities to use the Romany lan-
guage” (RR 2000 SK). In Estonia the law allows that municipalities make a request
to use Russian as their administrative language in parallel to Estonian, yet, only if
more than 50 percent of the local population are Russian speakers. “However, in
practice, a number of municipalities use Russian as a working language” (RR 1999
EE).
Turning to the links between naturalisation and language laws in the two Baltic
States, official language tests and the provision of training opportunities supporting
Russian speakers to meet the requirements are focal points of the reports. Apart
from bureaucratic delays, strict language requirements were often “cited as the
main disincentives for securing citizenship” (RR 1999 EE). Yet, besides enabling
the Russian-speaking minority to pass language tests, language training is consid-40
ered as a key integration instrument in Estonia and Latvia (cf. RR 1999 EE; RR
1999-2001 LV). It includes measures such as intensive training in vocational and
higher education, provision of teaching materials, language training camps and
youth work.
A different field in which language is an issue concerns minority rights in educa-
tion (see below, p. 42). It turns around the right for teaching of and in a minority
language, but also to run whole educational institutions i42n a minority language.
The discussions in the reports on Romania concentrate on the establishment of a
Hungarian speaking as well as a multi-cultural Hungarian-German university (RR
1998-2001 RO). For the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, the reports state that a law
allowing the use of minority languages and education in minority languages exists.
In Bulgaria, concrete progress is however not reported for the Roma peoples but
only with view to the Turkish minority for which “[n]o particular complaints as
regards their educational or language rights were reported” (RR 1998 BU).
Unlike the other candidate states, Hungary and Slovakia have promulgated the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. As the 2001 assessment of
Hungary explains, making available education to Roma in their mother tongue and
language was one of the central measures the government introduced as a conse-
quence. Apart from the already stated problem that due to a lack of information na-
tional minorities make only little use of their rights (RR 2001 SK), the 2000 report
on Slovakia further remarks that too little data is available to judge on the imple-
mentation of new the language legislation.
In sum, only little attention is being paid to the use of minority languages in the
media. Only the Regular Reports on Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania elaborate on
minority protection in the context of media at all (see below, p. 46).
Education
Discrimination in the educational sector finds expression in the denial of open ac-
cess to mainstream education. The reports refer to many instances in which children
of minority groups are placed in separate classes or special schools for mentally or
physically handicapped. Romani children are most affected by such de facto segre-41
gation. As a result the children remain on a very low level of education with far
reaching negative consequences for their future chances for employment and inclu-
sion into society. Due to long-lasting direct and indirect effects, education is an
issue in all Regular Reports and in many states “[e]ducation is considered a main
priority in improving the situation of the Roma and other minorities” (RR 1998
HU).
Especially disproportional high numbers of Romani children in special schools are
a reoccurring topic of the Regular Reports. According to the Commission’s assess-
ment, Roma represent some 70% of the children at special schools in the Czech Re-
public (cf. RR 1999, 2001 CZ). The 2000 report on Hungary even estimates that in
certain parts of the country up to 94 per cent of the Romani children are placed in
special schools, and the national Ombudsman for Ethnic and Minority Rights com-
mented that “the disproportionately high number of Roma pupils in these schools is
unjustified and a sign of discrimination” (RR 2000 HU). The reports on Slovakia
also mention the continuing overrepresentation of Roma students in schools for re-
tarded children, and that in a number of cases the separation into different class-
rooms is reported (cf. RR 2000). The 2001 report on the Bulgarian situation states
that many Romani children do not attend school at all and that for those who do
frequent a school the drop out rate is very high. Apart from this, schools in areas
resided exclusively by Roma remain in practice segregated. Poor schooling stan-
dards have also effects on the proportion of Roma in higher education, which re-
mains very low (below one per cent in Hungary).
Inspecting minority rights in education, not only the use of minority languages but
also the instruction of subjects relevant to minority groups are at stake. Apart from
introducing subjects such as language, history and culture of minorities into the
curricula, teachers can be trained in these subject matters in order to provide better
understanding and thus better education of pupils from a minority background.
Moreover, the right to run special educational institutions finds expression in the
reports. In this context all Regular Reports on Romania make a reference to the
planned establishment of a bi-lingual university. This is, however, an exception,
since the reports on other applicant states do not explicitly elaborate on the estab-
lishment or existence of multicultural universities. Another issue which occurs only42
once in the reports on Hungary the existence of study grants and the provision of
specific education and teaching materials for Roma students (RR 2001, 2002 HU).
In the reports for Estonia and Latvia the emphasis is not on unequal opportunities
for minorities but turns around the language question discussed above. Thus, the
reports mention language training as a key integrative element for adults and so-
cially disadvantaged groups. Further, regulations to allow minorities to protect
their cultural rights, i.e. opportunities for teaching in minority language, are dis-
cussed. The latter can be put into practice by either bi-lingual teaching or minority
schools that work in genuinely developed models which are subject to approval.
Teachers at minority schools generally need a certain level of proficiency in the
state language. While in Latvia from 2004 onwards all state funded schools will
supply secondary education (from 10
th grade onwards) in the state language only,
Estonian law provides that after 2007 a proportion of 40 per cent of teaching in up-
per secondary schools can remain in other languages and 60 per cent is to be in
Estonian with exceptions being possible. Moreover, in Estonia public funding for
Russian elementary schools covering the period of compulsory education is ensured
until 2007/8 (cf. RR 2000 EE). Where there is a popular demand, full-time Russian-
language education in Basic Schools and Gymnasiums may continue beyond 2007
(cf. RR 2002 EE).
Employment
Rising unemployment rates have been a characteristic of the transformation econo-
mies in all CEEC.
60 Yet even if taking this into account, the unemployment rate,
especially among Roma, is appallingly high. This is not only due to poorer educa-
tion but also because of direct discrimination. The reports estimate for the Roma
population in working an unemployment rate ranging form about 60-75 (RR 2001
BU) to 70-97 percent (RR 1999-2001 CZ). Discrimination takes effect in many
ways, for example concerning hiring practices in general (cf. RR 2002 CZ), or such
particular examples as job advertisements that explicitly exclude Roma (cf. RR
                                                     
60 The development of overall unemployment varied across the countries concerning both scale and
sequencing. The highest rates of overall unemployment according to country: BU 18.1% (2002), CZ 8.7%
(2000), EE 12.5 (2000), HU 8.4% (1998), LV 14.3 (1998), RO 7 (2002), and SK 19.4 (2001) (see EUROSTAT
Total unemployment rate –Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=1-em071-
EN&mode=download, last update 12 November 2003, accessed 20 November 2003)..43
2001 RO). Yet, also state legislation may have discriminative effects. As already
brought up (cf. p. 36), Latvia legislation restricts non-Latvian speakers to exercise
certain jobs (RR 1999 LV). Such laws significantly limit the opportunities for the
minority not speaking the state language and thus add to higher unemployment fig-
ures among Russian speakers.
Another effect of deficient education is that, if employed, Roma are mostly work-
ing as unskilled labourers. On the other side, the proportion of Roma in public of-
fices (administration, parliamentary representations, police etc.) remains extremely
low. Against this background, the Commission assessed positively a Bulgarian pro-
gramme countering youth unemployment which included recruiting 50 young Roma
into the police force (RR 2000 BU). Similarly, the 2000 Regular Report on Hun-
gary refers to the “Roma Policemen Programme” under which the number of Roma
police officers was increased and co-operation with Roma organisations was en-
hanced. Furthermore, public work programmes and public utility work programmes
were introduced. Job creation programmes for Roma exist in almost all CEEC, yet
often lacking sufficient resources to ensure implementation. Due to high unem-
ployment rates among Roma, but also because of the fact that Roma are mainly
working in unskilled labour, they are also most affected by economic decline or
downward trends. As the Regular Report on Bulgaria for the year 2000 records,
regions with a concentrated minority population continue as a whole to suffer from
low investment and high unemployment.
Health and Housing
Housing, the access to health care and other social services are not facets of special
minority rights. Rather, it must be considered as discrimination if members of a
minority are treated less favourable than other groups of society. Deficiencies re-
lated to housing are diverse. One aspect is illegally built housing which, according
to a survey referred to in the 2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria, represent approxi-
mately 70 per cent of houses in Roma neighbourhoods. Despite government pro-
grammes many municipalities refuse to legalise these houses and thereby the right
to public services (RR 2001 BU). Another view is given in the 2001 report on the
Czech situation: “Many Roma reside in low-quality municipal apartments often
with inadequate hygienic conditions, which leads frequently towards social margi-44
nalisation” (RR 2001 CZ). Similarly the 2000 report on Hungary notes that Roma
live in parts of the country with underdeveloped infrastructures and weak economic
structures.
The situation of Roma is aggravated in several states where long term unemploy-
ment and the lack of citizenship or permanent residence disqualify Roma from ac-
cess to non-contributory health insurance and public health care systems. The
Regular Reports do not go into detail about concrete health problems.
61 Still, they
state that in all states monitored Roma live in considerably lower health and hous-
ing conditions than the mainstream population, which causes social exclusion of
members of a minority. As the 2000 Regular Report for Hungary explains, poor
health and living conditions cause a live expectance for Roma which is on average
ten to fifteen years below the average in the rest of the population.
Single reports dwell on further difficulties related to the living conditions of Roma.
For instance, some reports refer to concrete incidents of physical segregation. The
Czech case of the city Utsi nad Labem, where a wall was built to segregate a Roma
residential area from the rest of the city, was given attention to in the 1999 and
2000 reports. Another incident amplified in the 1998 report refers to local officials
promoting “that ‘problem citizens’ be moved out of city centres”, or proposing to
subsidise those Roma who would sign over their flat to the city upon their depar-
ture. Further, “[t]here have also been some incidents of municipalities proposing to
separate Roma from other residents” (RR 1998 CZ).
Political Participation
Protection of the right to political participation must be analysed at different levels.
On the one hand, the right to vote and stand as candidate relates to the protection
from discrimination. On the other hand, special thresholds for representation in
parliamentary assemblies, the establishment of local self-governments or the ap-
                                                     
61 The Open Society Institute illustrates: “Throughout the region, Roma experience serious health
problems associated with extremely poor living conditions which are compounded by large-scale exclusion
from the public health system and a range of social services. In many communities, Roma have lower life
expectancies and higher infant mortality rates than the majority, and suffer comparatively higher rates of
asthmatic ailment, as well as tuberculosis” (OSI 2001 a: 37).45
pointment of minority representatives as consultative body to government institu-
tions are aspects of minority rights.
62
One reason for which minorities are excluded from political participation is
the denial of citizenship (cf. above p. 36), which mostly affects the Russian-
speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia. Strict language regulations (cf. above p.
37) further restrict the participation of the largest minority of the Baltic States.
While in Estonia amendments to the language law, which would have required
members of parliament and of local councils to prove good knowledge of Estonian,
were rejected (cf. RR 1998 EE), the Election law in Latvia prescribes language re-
quirements for members of parliament (cf. RR 2000 LV).
A threshold for minority representation in the national parliament exists in Roma-
nia where fifteen seats are reserved for minorities in the Chamber of Deputies, of
which one is reserved for a Roma representative (Commission 1997).
63 Apart from
the Romanian only the Hungarian constitution provides for special minority repre-
sentation. Here, the constitution complemented by the “the 1993 law on minorities,
provide for the principle of the representation in Parliament, but these provisions
have not always been given practical application” (Commission 1997: Opinion
HU). No specific rules guaranteeing the representation of minorities in parliament
exist in the other states under perspective, and apart from the 1997 opinions this
topic does not find any attention in the Commission's assessments.
Throughout the candidate states Roma are better represented at regional and local
level than at the national level. Concerning local self-governments, Hungary has
the most far-reaching regulations. Here, an extensive system of local self-
governments has been established.
64  The 1999 Regular Report illustrates in this
context: “Following the elections of the local minority self-governments, the num-
ber of Roma self-governments has almost doubled. This trend can be interpreted as
                                                     
62 The Open Society Institute evaluates on this issue that although the candidate states have introduced
some “innovative measures to create channels for participation” in practice “neither the Roma nor the Rus-
sian-speaking minorities can be said to have achieved effective representation in national parliamentary or
governmental structures” (OSI 2001 a: 59).
63 For more details see Gál, who also elaborates on this problem in a cross-country comparison (cf. Gál
2000: 9).
64 “Some have noted that since minority self-governments in Hungary are strictly consultative in nature,
the system has effectively institutionalised the political marginalisation of Roma. Moreover, local govern-
ments often ignore the requirement to consult with minority self-governments” (OSI 2001 a: 59-60).46
an increasing participation of Roma in public life. Specific Roma Community cen-
tres (established with financial support from the State budget) support local com-
munities and contribute to preserving Roma culture”.
65 The Czech 2002 report
elaborates on the appointment of Roma co-ordinators at regional level following the
transfer of competencies to the regions. The evaluation, however, remains critical.
Due to changes in the administrative design “the fate of the much appreciated Roma
advisors seems uncertain, as their administrative basis, the District Offices, will be
abolished by the end of 2002”, a network that the Commission assesses as useful in
providing contact points between Roma and the community.
66
Consultative bodies usually operate through experts who work as advisors on the
national and sometimes at local level. Such advisors were introduced in several
states, they have no decision-making power but offer minorities the opportunity to
express their views on issues of concern to them through a designated representa-
tive (for further details see below, p. 56).
Media
Representation of minorities in media only finds mentioning in the reports of cer-
tain countries. Minority rights in this area concern, on the one hand, programmes in
minority languages or such programmes that deal with particular minority issues.
On the other hand, the picture that is drawn of minorities by the media is relevant
with regard to distribution of discriminative attitudes and the reproduction of
stereotypes.
According to the 2001 assessment of Hungary, the National Television and Radio
Board granted a broadcasting license for Europe’s only Roma Radio, which how-
                                                     
65 For Bulgaria, the reports state that the “the Turkish minority continues to be fully integrated and
represented in political life” (RR 1998 BGL) whereas the representation of Roma does not find such positive
mentioning. The Commission remarks critically that the Constitution forbids organisations or political parties
that are founded on ethnic, racial or religious grounds and encourages the government to clarify these provi-
sions with reference to the restrictions on the establishment of political parties as to ensure compatibility with
international obligations (RR 1999 BGL).
66 Gál, however, notices that “[i]n most of the cases where democratic forces are in the government as a
result of election of the mid 90’s it is interesting to see that the most important and powerful minority organi-
sations have become part of the government coalitions” (2000: 10). This was, for instance, the case in Slova-
kia and Romania where there are strong Hungarian minorities. Nonetheless, due to its internal fragmentation,
the Roma community does nowhere constitute one of the “most powerful” organisations and hence remains
less represented than other minorities. For example, in Slovakia a “Deputy Prime Minister for Human
Rights, National Minorities and Regional Development who belongs to the Hungarian Coalition Party was
appointed” (RR 1999 SK).47
ever had the side effect that the budget of the Roma Magazine of the Hungarian
public service TV was considerably decreased.
Other positive assessments are made about Bulgaria where in almost all
electronic media minority participation through specialised programmes has been
made possible. Apart from national TV broadcasts that supply Turkish news and
two programmes that address minority issues and are also produced by minority
representatives, a Roma Cable TV broadcasts nation wide (RR 2001 BU). Moreo-
ver, seminars for local, regional and national media were carried out in order to
raise positive public awareness on minority issues (RR 2002 BU).
67 In contrast, Lat-
vian law “holds that all films to be shown on television must be dubbed into the
state language or have Latvian subtitles. The amount of permitted time to broadcast
in foreign languages has been decreased from 30% previously to 25% in October
1998” (RR 1999 LV).
Of the states this study relates to, negative media coverage on minorities is
exclusively reported from the Czech Republic (RR 1998).
68
                                                     
67 Gál adds that in Romania, too, programmes in minority languages are broadcasted on national and
provincial TV and radio (2000: 11).
68 Yet, according to Gál negative coverage is also a problem in other candidate states (Gál 2001: 11).48
Part III
Implementing Minority protection
So far, this paper has concentrated on the living conditions of Russian speaking and
Roma minorities in Central and Eastern Europe by looking at the main issues
around which minority protection in the candidate states turns. Yet, the Commis-
sion goes well beyond illustrating the situation in the candidate sates. Most obvi-
ously by formulating the priorities of the Accession Partnerships concrete im-
provements that are to be met prior to accession are defined. The EU hereby exerts
pressure and promotes specific policies in the accession countries. Apart from this,
indirect involvement the EU has developed own policies. Thus, for example, pro-
grammes to improve the situation of Roma were introduced
69, the anti-
discrimination acquis has been extended, and in connection to this the European
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) has been established. Fur-
ther, concerning the candidate states, the EU promotes certain policies not only
through the accession criteria but also through support provided in the PHARE
framework.
70 The EU involvement in the minority policies of the CEEC accentuates
the importance the EU puts on policies developed and implemented in the candidate
states.
The following is to analyse which specific policies have been pursued on the part
of the CEEC governments and how the Regular Reports take note of these actions.
In other words: Which policies are implemented and how does the Commission
evaluate these? To this end, three spheres shall be scrutinised. First, the legal
frameworks and the role of international instruments will be analysed since they
constitute the basis of minority protection. Secondly, the institutions that have been
established or adapted in order to provide minority protection will be presented.
And thirdly, governmental approaches to implement minority policies shall be ex-
amined. Alike to the last chapter the aim is not only to provide an overview on the
state of affairs. Rather, the illustration is to highlight especially those issues which
                                                     
69 Support for Roma communities in the CEEC is mainly channelled through the PHARE programme.
Moreover, the EU has developed programmes to improve the situation of Roma people in EU Member States.
Some of these programmes are open for participation for Roma from the CEEC (cf. Commission 2002 b: 7)
70 For instance, PHARE supports language training programmes in Estonia and Latvia.49
the EU considers as central and to show how the Commission assesses improve-
ments in the relevant areas.
Minority Protection at Legal Level
The progress in minority protection at legal level is one of the points on the Com-
mission's internal checklist (cf. p. 32). Accordingly, the reports’ chapters on Hu-
man Rights and the Protection of Minorities usually start with a short summary on
which major international human rights instruments the respective state has signed
and ratified in the preceding year and which central conventions the state has still
not acceded to. Furthermore, significant changes in the national legislation find
mentioning. Representing the framework for minority protection, the constitution
and legislation are the basis for all national minority policy. Which are then the
international instruments the Commission considers essential for the applicant
states to accede to?
In this context, international undertakings play a central role not only because the
assessment of the political Copenhagen criteria relates to these conventions but also
because the inclusion of international instruments into national legal frameworks is
part of the accomplishments expected from the CEEC. The opinions published in
the Agenda 2000 uniformly take note of two such agreements, namely the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe
and the Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, which provides for collective rights of minorities but is not legally bind-
ing.
71 The subsequent Regular Reports continue to make routine mentioning on the
status of the Framework Convention, whereas the Recommendation 1201 is not
taken up again. Further international instruments the reports dwell on are, for ex-
ample, the European Social Charter, as well as its revised version, and the Addi-
tional Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
72 The number and choice of conventions com-
mented on varies between the reports. However, consistency is guaranteed since
                                                     
71 The  Framework Convention and the Recommendation are the only instruments monitored in the
Opinions. Alone the opinion on Latvia refrains from commenting on any convention.
72 With view to these specific conventions, the reports also comment on non-ratification of a state,
while other conventions listed in the reports annexes are normally only mentioned when a state signed or
ratified an agreement.50
1999 by an Annex showing which human rights Conventions have been ratified by
all candidate states (see below).
73
Notably, the Additional Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is referred to in a
number of reports, does not form part of the annexed list. The same holds true for
Recommendation 1201 monitored in the 1997 opinions. Yet, once more the fact that
collective rights are not an issue for EU Member States may be an indication why
certain agreements were excluded from monitoring in the Copenhagen framework.
Source: European Commission (09.10.2002): Strategy Paper and Report of the European Com-
mission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries.
                                                     
73 Since this list was added to the annex of each Regular Report in 1999, only few changes occurred.
While the 1999 and 2000 lists refer to the Additional Protocol to the Revised European Social Charter (system
of collective complaints), this protocol is not included in the 2001 and 2002 lists. Instead, in 2001/02 the lists
refer for the first time to the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women. The list is annexed to all Regular Reports as well as the Commission’s Strategy
Papers.51
In most CEEC the constitutions provide that once ratified by the national parlia-
ment, international instruments become automatically part of the domestic legisla-
tion and that international law prevails over domestic law (cf. Gál 2000: 7). The
status of minorities in the constitutions is principally tackled by basic rights of
non-discrimination and the protection of the identity as minorities. Of the states
under perspective, only the Hungarian constitution provides for collective rights of
minorities and certain rights of self-government and cultural autonomy.
74
The Regular Reports mainly concentrate on legislation implementing the ba-
sic principles of minority protection. Only in few cases constitutional amendments
are at issue: An example is the 2001 report on Bulgaria in which the Commission
criticises the Bulgarian Constitution for forbidding the organisation of political
parties along ethnical, racial or religious lines. Relating to international standards
the report estimates: “It could be desirable to clarify these Constitutional provi-
sions with reference to the restrictions on the establishment of political parties, as
it is important to ensure compatibility with international obligations”. Further re-
marks on constitutional amendments can be found in the reports on Latvia where
the parliament “amended the Constitution to include a new section outlining basic
human rights” (RR 1998 LV), and in the 2002 report which refers to constitutional
changes which introduced certain measures strengthening the state language in the
context of election legislation. In Slovakia, constitutional amendments created the
legal basis for the creation of an ombudsman office (RR 2000 SK).
The question of how basic legal frameworks are transposed in concrete laws is re-
lated to the compliance of legislation with the constitution. This finds mentioning,
for instance, in the reports on Estonia (RR 2000), and Slovakia (RR 1998). In this
context, occasional reference is made to rulings of the national supreme courts or
statements and reports by ombudspersons who are empowered to ensure legislative
compliance by the state with the constitution (e.g. RR 2001 EE). Another aspect of
the elaboration of national legislation is touched on in a number of cases in which
the reports also notice explicitly the progress in transposing EU anti-discrimination
                                                     
74 Gál states: “Collective rights of minorities and a certain degree of minority self-government or cul-
tural autonomy are enshrined only in the Hungarian, Slovenian and to some extent in the Croatian constitution
and legal system” (2000: 6).52
legislation (e.g. RR 2001 BU, EE, LV, SK). In the 2001 Regular Reports this issue
is uniformly taken under scrutiny in chapter 13 that focuses on Social policy and
employment.
75 Concrete changes the reports dwell on have already been mentioned
and cover fields such as the Estonian and Latvian language and citizenship legisla-
tion or laws on education (cf. pp. 32-47).
Unlike the assessments on institution building and policy-making, the reports’
opinions on the implementation of changes to the CEEC constitutional and legal
frameworks are mainly illustrative and state only certain shortcomings concerning
the ratification of special international undertakings or the content of particular
laws. Especially the later Regular Reports draw their attention increasingly to
questions of implementing legal provisions, the issue we will turn now to.
Minority Protection at Institutional Level
Institutions are at the heart of effective minority protection in any state. Only
through a suitable institutional set-up that is adequately equipped with human and
financial resources can policies be effectively implemented. Administrative capac-
ity building is hence one of the main objectives the EU aims to foster and support
in the pre-accession process. This is reflected in the Accession Partnerships and by
the fact that, in order to promote institution building, around 30% of PHARE re-
sources are spent to assist the accession candidates in developing the structures,
strategies, human resources and management skills which are needed to strengthen
their economic, social, regulatory and administrative capacities. Moreover, in the
further advanced stages of the pre-accession phase emphasise shifted more and
more to policy-making and implementation of policies. Since minority protection is
a new policy field for the young Central and Eastern European democracies, estab-
lishing new institutions is indispensable. Nonetheless, also adaptations or reforms
of already existing institutions should not be neglected.
The latter point takes a much less prominent place in the reports and is prevalently
brought up in connection to mistreatment of minorities from the institutional side.
As mentioned above (cf. page 33-36), institutional discriminative behaviour oc-
                                                     
75 The inclusion of this chapter is of special relevance since the anti-discrimination acquis is the central
common instrument to (indirectly) provide for a certain degree of minority protection in the European Union.53
curred especially in the police, courts and (local) administrations or by the hand of
(local) politicians. Concerning already existing state institutions, the Commission’s
assessment is greatly restricted to statements on shortcomings and improvements
related to the reduction of discriminative structures – be it at legal level or in the
exercise of official duties.
In order to get a clearer picture on how minority protection is implemented at in-
stitutional level, it is useful to differentiate between basically three groups of in-
stitutions. First, there are institutions of minority participation and effective par-
ticipation in decision-making processes. Secondly, parliamentary Committees for
minority issues and offices of an ombudsperson have been established. And thirdly,
government offices on or for national minorities were set up (cf. Gál 2000: 9-10).
76
Although this specific differentiation is not being applied in the Commission
documents, it shall be used here because it enables us to better systematise the
various measures of the candidate countries which differ in the degree and empha-
sis they attribute to the single groups.
Institutionalised participation
77 and involvement of minorities in decision-making
processes is a greatly underrepresented issue in most accession states. One excep-
tion is Hungary where a network of minority self-governments exists on both the
local and national level (see also p. 45). Roma foundations and Roma Community
Houses complement these bodies. The self-governments function as agencies for
the implementation of governmental policies. Thus, the national Roma self-
government in co-operation with the Office for National Minorities was appointed
to implement the 1999-revised medium-term action programme of the government
(RR 1999 HU). After the 1999 elections, the number of local self-governments had
almost doubled which, according to the 1999 Regular Report, is a trend that “can be
interpreted as an increasing participation of Roma in public life” (cf. above p. 44).
One of the concrete programmes of local self-governments is the co-operation with
the police to tackle prejudice of the latter against Roma (RR 1999 HU). All in all,
the Regular Reports evaluate the Hungarian approach very positively: “Through the
                                                     
76 Some of these institutions have already been dealt with in the chapter on political participation (p.
44-46). Where this is the case, a reference to the preceding part shall suffice.
77 Apart from this, minority representation in local self-governments exists in Romania (cf. also p. 44)
and Slovakia.54
system of local self-Governments, minorities have a considerable degree of cultural
autonomy as well as a wide range of educational and linguistic rights” (RR 2001
HU). Roma self-governments also find mentioning in the 2002 Slovakian report
which explains that municipalities and regional self-governments have recently ac-
quired new competencies due to which implementation of regional development,
education and social protection measures are increasingly carried out on this level.
In the second group of institutions the role of an ombudsperson is strongly empha-
sised. The special attention given to this institution must be seen in the context of
the Union’s anti-discrimination acquis. A body with special authority to promote
the rights of persons discriminated against will be a legal obligation for all Member
States after July 2003. The EU’s legal definition of such an office is formulated in
chapter III, article 13 of the Race Equality Directive: “Member States shall desig-
nate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies may form
part of agencies charged at national level with the defence of human rights or the
safeguard of individuals’ rights” (cf. above pp. 9).
78 Since this directive has to be
implemented only by 2003, the establishment of such a body cannot yet be a pre-
condition for accession under the Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, the existence
and functioning of ombudspersons and offices receives great attention in the re-
ports.
79
Ombudspersons have already been appointed by the parliaments of a great
number of candidate states.
80 The Regular Reports on the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia refer to the existence of an ombudsman, who in
some of these sates is also called human rights Commissioner or Legal Chancellor.
While these bodies are generally constituted as independent state institutions their
responsibilities and effective powers differ slightly from state to state. In general,
                                                     
78 See the Council Directive, European Council (2000): Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 29 June.
79 An ombudsman office is also held important by other international bodies. Hence the OSCE High
Commissioner for National Minorities asserts: “In some cases it may be necessary to establish specialized
State bodies to combat discrimination. In a number of OSCE countries, such bodies have made a valuable
contribution toward combating racism and other forms of discrimination. Another model that has proven ef-
fective in some countries is that of an ombudsman” (OSCE 2000: 5).
80 Gál differentiates between ombudspersons “with a mandate covering misconduct on part of authori-
ties in human rights and/or minority rights questions” and bodies or ombudspersons “appointed by parliament
without special mandate for minority issues [which] have the task to monitor the activities of public bodies
and protect human rights in general by investigating complaints” (2000: 10), the latter being in place in the
Czech Republic and Romania.55
ombudspersons are, on the one hand, to reinforce the protection of citizens against
unlawful conduct and mal-administration by public institutions, i.e. to investigate
infringements of constitutional rights. On the other hand, offices of this body are to
deal with specific complaints by citizens regarding the work of the state or state
officials.
81 Apart from an Ombudsman for National Minorities, the reports on Hun-
gary also refer to an Ombudsman for Educational Affairs, as well as one for Civil
and Political Rights. For Romania and Estonia the establishment of further regional
offices is mentioned in the reports (RR 2001 RO; RR 1999 EE).
Another institution safeguarding minority rights are parliamentary commit-
tees. Yet, the Regular Reports do not draw much attention to these committees.
Solely the 1999 report on Slovakia remarks that “Parliament established a Com-
mittee for Human Rights and National Minorities, including a commission for
Roma issues” as part of an overall package by the Slovak authorities to improve the
parliamentary and governmental structures for addressing minority issues.
82
The third class of institutions is related to governmental policies. These institutions
are concerned with the elaboration and implementation of governmental pro-
grammes and policies. Direct minority involvement mostly occurs in form of con-
sultative bodies that advise the government or administrative organs. Advisory
bodies are thereby also to function as intermediate between the government and
NGOs in shaping minority policies.
The most common form of dealing with minority issues at governmental
level are inter-ministerial committees which exist in a number of CEEC. While in
the Czech Republic and Hungary the committees (or commissions) are special are-
nas to deal with Roma issues, the Romanian committee has a sub-committee for
Roma affairs. In Latvia a co-ordination institution is to ensure consistency in gov-
ernmental policies. Depending on the country, the committees are responsible for
                                                     
81 As the OSCE report elaborates, Hungary and Romania have ombudsmen whose competences also
include issues of discrimination against Roma. The perceptions of efficiency of these ombudspersons vary
however. While difficult to generalise, there is a tendency that ombudsmen who play a highly visible role in
identifying problems confronting Roma or promoting reforms to address those problems enjoy significant
legitimacy. In these cases even critics who fault institutions of ombudsman for lacking more vigorous en-
forcement powers appreciate the fact that communities have an advocate in government (which itself can help
narrow chasm of mistrust between Roma communities/national authorities). Legitimacy of ombudsman offices
within Romani communities can be further increased if staff includes Roma (OSCE 2000: 59).
82 Gál, however, explains that “[i]n most of the countries in the region parliamentary committees exist
for dealing with minority issues, mostly in the framework of the general human rights question” (2000: 10).56
developing strategies to promote the integration of minorities, and/or for supervis-
ing and administering the implementation of respective programmes.
For the Czech Republic the 1999 report mentions that the number of Roma
representatives  in the inter-ministerial commission was increased from 6 to 12.
Apart from this, a “network of 'Roma advisers' in the districts has continued to play
a key positive role. In practice, advisers have gradually become contact-points for
the Roma communities themselves. Advisers liase with the Inter-Ministerial Roma
Commission and some are currently members of it” (RR 1999 CZ).
Similar commissions or national councils including members of the govern-
ment as well as various minority representatives exist in Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovakia, where they are to take part in the development of strategies for minority
policies. In Romania, a working group of Roma associations was established which
is set up by the Roma community and includes elected representatives from the
Community who are to facilitate the liaison with the public authorities (RR 1999
RO).
Another sort of relevant institutions are government bodies which execute govern-
mental policies. Examples are the Latvian Naturalisation and Citizenship and Mi-
gration Boards as well as the Estonian National Language and Citizenship and Mi-
gration Boards. Since these bodies are responsible for executing naturalisation
policies, they are central to the specific problem of non-citizenship amongst the
Russian speaking population. Unlike the other CEEC, both Estonia and Latvia have
established a foundation to support social integration, namely the Non-Estonian
Integration Foundation and the (Social) Integration Foundation. These foundations
include representatives from local governments, NGOs and others. In Estonia the
Foundation is responsible for the implementation of the State Integration Pro-
gramme under the control of the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs.
Yet other government agencies are national offices/bureaux. The Hungarian
Office for Ethnic and National Minorities in co-operation with the national Roma
self-government prepares and monitors the implementation of governmental pro-
grammes. The Legal defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, set up by
the Ministry of Interior, shall serve to improve legal protection of Roma. Moreover,
Hungary has set up Local Conflict Management Offices. In Romania National Of-
fice for Roma, and in and Slovakia a Bureau of Legal Protection for Ethnic Minori-57
ties are to supervise minority protection. The role of the Latvian National Human
Rights Office has been an issue in the recommendations of the OSCE, which
launched a discussion on the transformation of the office into an ombudsman insti-
tution with a broader mandate. Although the National Office has started to imple-
ment some short-term recommendations by an international expert group to im-
prove co-ordination and to avoid duplication between the state bodies, an inde-
pendent ombudsman office has not been founded (RR 2001 LV).
The Regular Reports assessing Institutions
The illustration of how the CEEC implement minority protection at institutional
level has already touched on views the Commission expresses in its reports. Taking
a closer look at the evaluations, the most dominant and recurrent arguments turn
around a lack of human and financial resources and the lack of independent powers
of institutions. Although it needs to be stressed that the evaluations of the Open
Society Institute and those of the Commission are not fully equivalent, the follow-
ing synopsis of the Institute gives a good overview also on the Regular Reports’
criticisms. According to the Open Society Institutes’ assessment, insufficiencies of
governmental institutions can be summarised in “three principal shortcomings”
(OSI 2001: 62). First, in all cases the mandate of institutions remains essentially
consultative with respect to governmental counterparts. Secondly, none of the in-
stitutions is vested with “sufficient financial or human resources to confront prob-
lems such as discrimination”. Finally, government institutions responsible for mi-
nority affairs have not been granted legal powers to ensure adequate enforcement of
minority protection laws (OSI 2001: 62-66).
83
More detailed is the Regular Reports’ list concerning shortcomings affecting the
work of the ombudsmen offices. While formal functions have been established and
although national parliaments have appointed ombudsmen, the effective powers and
resources these possess remain insufficient in all CEEC. Thus, the Czech ombuds-
man has no power to sanction the authorities and only limited force to notify supe-
rior organs or even to make a case public. Although in most CEEC the cases sub-
mitted to ombudsmen have increased, only for Estonia an increase in staff is re-
                                                     
83 The Institute draws from this the following conclusion: “Thus, to date, non country in the accession
region has a functioning official body with specific responsibility to enforce anti-discrimination law or assist
victims in seeking legal redress” (OSI 2001 a: 44).58
ported (RR 2001 EE), while in Slovakia the personal was reduced (RR 2001 SK).
The Romanian reports on the years 2000 and 2001 take positive note on rising
numbers of complaints submitted which “shows growing public awareness of the
role and function of the Ombudsman” (RR 2000 RO). However, effectiveness and
credibility of the ombudsman were undermined because of insufficient co-operation
from the side of other state institutions which failed to respond to questions from
the ombudsman within the legally set deadline (RR 2001 RO). Very blankly, the
1999 Hungarian report puts down the case that “[t]he Ministry has not accepted the
Ombudsman’s report”.
These problems affect basically all relevant institutions, although in few instances
an increase of staffing and budgetary resources is reported. This holds also true for
those institutions responsible for implementing governmental policies as well as for
experts and consultative bodies. Moreover, the actual set-up of certain institutions
appears ineffective, one example being the Hungarian inter-ministerial sub-
committee on Roma matters which, despite meeting, proved unable to produce any
substantial results (RR 2000 HU).
Implementation of Minority Protection: Governmental Approaches
In the cause of the accession-process the Commission has put increasing emphasis
on the need for the candidate states to develop action plans on minority protection.
To date, the governments of all candidate states have set up national action plans to
improve minority protection. For some of the programmes the reports state explic-
itly that minority representatives were actively involved in the drafting process (RR
1999 BU, HU). The national action plans provide for the concrete blueprints on
how to tackle particular minority related aspects. Containing outlines for intended
measures, they are thus a central but still distinctive element of the actual imple-
mentation of minority policies.
The diverse candidate states introduced their action programmes between 1997 and
2002. As the names tell, plans such as The Integration of Society in Latvia and Na-
tional Programme for Latvian Language Training, the Framework programme for
the integration of Roma into Bulgarian Society, or the Concept of the Government
Policy towards Members of the Roma Community pick up relevant problems of each59
particular state. Touching basically on the areas described above as focal points of
the Regular Reports, the action plans are concerned with issues like discrimination,
unemployment, education, health care, housing, cultural protection, and access to
national media, citizenship, naturalisation, language training, etc. Over the years
some states have revised their programmes and added new priorities including as-
pects like positive action in education, employment, social and health care and
housing; support or minority culture and language, but also “changing social atti-
tudes” (cf. RR 2002 CZ).
Certain states have moreover introduced special measures to reinforce better im-
plementation. The 2002 Czech report refers for instance to “a set of measures [the
Government has adopted] to achieve a more vigorous implementation of govern-
ment policy for Roma [...]. Key Measures include the extension of the ‘street work-
ers’ (social workers) scheme, the adoption of a primary school pilot project over
2002-2003 school year and the extension of preparatory classes to prepare Roma
children for mainstream primary schools and the presence of assistant teachers be-
yond primary school”.
Furthermore, a number of states have introduced specific additional pro-
grammes, for instance to tackle prejudice and discrimination between Roma and the
police (RR 1999 HU). Other special programmes mentioned are a Czech anti-
racism campaign and a so-called Tolerance Project (RR 2001 CZ) which aimed to
improve the communication and support cultural activities focusing on national mi-
norities. The initiative was taken up again in a project “consisting mainly of an in-
formation and media campaign at regional and local level, a media presentation of
the Roma social street workers, as well as an education campaign at secondary
schools” (RR 2002 CZ). A problem often raised in the reports on the Baltic States
(cf. above, p. 37) was tackled by Latvia in “an expensive campaign informing the
public about citizenship issues” (RR 2002 LV). Besides the national integration
programme, the 1999 Latvian report also mentions a National Programme for Lat-
vian Language Training supported by PHARE means. The language programme
also includes integration at the community level through summer camps, youth
clubs, etc. Another measure was implemented in Hungary where a special anti-
discrimination network of legal offices, set up by the Ministry of Justice, offers
legal assistance free of charge to members of a minority group (RR 2002 HU).60
Apart from specific programmes designed to enhance integration or the
situation of Roma and Russian speakers, minority issues are ideally also dealt with
in national programmes aiming at other policy fields, say education, employment or
health care. The action-plans are generally funded by the state budget and make use
of international assistance for certain projects – including PHARE means.
The Regular Reports assessing Implementation
The reports evaluate the national action plans differently. While “Bulgaria has a
good Framework Programme on integration of minorities targeted at Roma” and
Romania “has made steady progress in implementing last year’s Roma strategy”
(RR 2002 RO), the Hungarian “programme itself does not provide a detailed strat-
egy for addressing the problems specified” (RR 2002). Generally, the main part of
the criticism that the assessments raise concentrates on the actual implementation
of the programmes. Only few states receive slightly better evaluations. Thus the
2002 report on Estonia assesses that “the implementation of the integration pro-
gramme appears to have continued satisfactorily”. The following part will state the
central points of the Regular Reports’ critical assessments.
Naturally, as the pre-accession phase draws to an end, the tangible implementation
of minority protection moves into the centre of attention. Despite the fact that
rather comprehensive approaches on how to tackle the situation of minorities have
been established, there is a discrepancy between the blueprints and the actual im-
plementation of these. This is also reflected by the fact that the implementation of
policy programmes takes a prominent place in the Accession Partnerships of all
states.
84 The 1999 partnership provisions for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary refer to existing programmes for which the priority is “to start implemen-
tation” (AP 1999 BU, HU) or to “implement actions contained” in the programme
(AP 1999 CZ). For those states which did not yet have a fully elaborated action
plan in 1999, the partnerships demand to “strengthen dialogue between the Gov-
ernment and the Roma community with a view to elaborating and implementing a
strategy to improve economic and social conditions of the Roma and provide ade-
quate financial support to minority programmes” (AP 1999 RO), respectively to
                                                     
84 The Accession Partnerships go beyond the aspect of governmental programmes and highlight certain
particular issues for each state which are however left out in this context since the point to be made here is the
general evaluation of how the candidate states implement minority policies.61
“improve the situation of the Roma through strengthened implementation including
provision for the necessary financial support at national and local levels, of meas-
ures aimed, notably, at fighting against discrimination (including within the public
administration), foster employment opportunities and increase access to education”
(AP 1999 SK). Both the partnerships on Estonia and on Latvia argue in a similar
vein, using the same wording to express that the state should “implement concrete
measures for the integration of non-citizens including language training and pro-
vide necessary financial support” (AP 1999 EE, LV). These targets are formulated
as short-term priorities for all the accession candidates. Central to the claims for
implementation is in all cases the demand for sufficient financial resources.
The 2001 Accession Partnerships do not differ in essence and refer to basi-
cally the same issues. Yet, instead of being called “short-term priorities” the targets
are listed under the heading “priorities and intermediate objectives”. Interesting for
our context is that the partnership on Romania explicitly refers to the need for ad-
ministrative capacity building “in order to implement the Government Strategy on
the improvement of the situation of Roma”. Another example in which the assess-
ment clearly emphasises the connection between institutions and an effective im-
plementation can be found in the evaluation of Bulgaria, for which the 2002 reports
stresses that “[i]f the Framework Programme is to be effectively implemented, in-
stitutional and administrative strengthening of the National Council on Ethnic and
Demographic Issues (NCEDI) is essential“.
Since these priorities are based on the findings of the Regular Reports, it does not
come as surprise that implementation is also the most central point in the evalua-
tions of the later reports. Although the main problem of sufficient monetary re-
sources applies to all states, there is a difference in how far the single countries
have advanced. Further problems that also touch on institutional aspects are men-
tioned, for instance, in connection with Hungary where “[t]he implementation of
the 1999 medium-term programme has further, progressed, but slowly, due to inef-
fective planning and the lack of co-ordination between the Ministries” (RR 2002
HU). A problem occurring in a number of states is that “Roma policy is not well
integrated into general social development strategies and exists as a separate and
parallel project” (RR 2002 HU), or similarly that “co-ordination among the relevant62
ministries and bodies, dealing with Roma issues, remains very weak” (RR 2002
SK).
Apart from the action plans, the implementation of the anti-discrimination acquis is
an important topic. While the 2001 assessment on Romania criticises that “compre-
hensive anti-discrimination legislation has been adopted – but it is not yet opera-
tional”, most other states are evaluated more positively on this issue. All in all, the
situation is well summarised by the latest Strategy Paper, issued by the commission
in October 2002. The document gives a condensed review on the main aspects the
Commission’s assessment attaches special importance to:
“In all countries with considerable Roma communities, progress has been made with the implementation of
national action plans to improve the difficult situation the members of these communities are facing. Contin-
ued efforts are required to ensure that the various action plans continue to be implemented in a sustained
manner, in close co-operation with Roma representatives. Adoption and due implementation of comprehen-
sive anti-discrimination legislation, in line with the Community anti-discrimination acquis, would be an im-
portant step forward where such legislation is still missing.
Further positive developments can be noted with regard to the protection of minorities. In Estonia and Latvia,
continued progress was made in the integration of non-citizens. In several countries, the legal and institu-
tional framework for the protection of minorities was further reinforced. In Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania
members of minority communities continued to play an important role in national political life” (Commission
2002 a: 13-14).
In the Commission’s later assessments, the implementation of actions plans attracts
clearly more attention. This, and the implementation of the anti-discrimination ac-
quis, remains the two areas in which, according to the Regular Reports’ evaluation,
improvements are still needed in all the future Member States.63
Part IV
Assessing the EU's Assessment
After this intensive discussion of the evaluation procedure, the contents of the re-
ports, minority policies the candidate countries pursue, and the views the Commis-
sion takes on the latter point, let us now return to the initial question to see which
answers may be deducted. How is the political criterion “minority protection” being
applied by the European Commission?
The introduction identified two areas in which challenges for the application
of the minority criterion were expected. On the one hand, consistency across the
countries and over the years was anticipated to be hard to achieve in the Regular
Reports. On the other hand, it was unclear how the Commission would operation-
alise the criterion for whose content the acquis lacks a clear legal basis. The analy-
sis of the Commission’s assessment procedure greatly falsified the expectation that
consistency within and across the Regular Reports was the central obstacle of EU
monitoring. However, the basis on which the minority criterion is operationalised
proved to be a fundamental problem to EU monitoring as such.
Assessing the EU’s assessment, I will summarise the findings made up to
this point. Based on this synopsis, conclusions on how the EU evaluates minority
protection in the Central and Eastern European candidate states shall be derived.
Procedures and Organisation of the Drafting Process
As far as the formal drafting of the Regular Reports (i.e. the organisation of the
assessment procedure) is concerned, the Commission follows an elaborated and
clearly defined structure. A lengthy drafting process follows an intensive period of
gathering information from a multitude of different sources. This involves a great
amount of actors and stretches over several months from the first preparatory draft
submitted by the delegations to the final publication of the reports. Both drafting
and the collection of information follow formalised guidelines that are summarised
in an internal handbook used by all Commission staff at any level. To further en-
sure an equal treatment across the candidate states and over the years, a special
horizontal unit in DG Enlargement overviews the whole process and functions as
co-ordinator ensuring consistency of the content of the draft versions produced by
the country teams. This intricate co-ordination involving multiple cross-reading and64
re-drafting phases provides a high degree of consistency. It thus seems that cross-
country inconsistencies are quite effectively evaded.
85 Thus, at the level of proce-
dures and co-ordination no major discrepancies could be found.
86
While consistency may be obtained by effective procedural rules established in the
Commission, operationalising the Copenhagen criteria faces the key problem that
“[m]inority protection, at present a sine qua non for accession, as outlined in the
accession criteria, is altogether absent from EU law” (Abdikeeva 2001: 2). Con-
cluding that the Copenhagen criteria turned out to be “a kind of ‘structural princi-
ple’ of the enlargement process” Toggenburg points out that Amsterdam transposed
all criteria into Primary law – except the one on minorities. “By doing so, the
Treaty gave the criteria a clear legal quality and defined them as founding princi-
ples of the EU which are common to all Member States (internal dimension, Article
6(1) TEC) and which are to be respected by any state applying for membership
(external dimension, Article 49 TEC). The fact that the minority clause was kept
separated appears to indicate that its inclusion – whereby it would have assumed a
clear binding force and an internal dimension – was not desired” (Toggenburg
2000: 17).
87
None the less, according to the accession criteria it was well desired to
monitor the candidate states’ minority policies. To realise its monitoring mandate,
the Commission refers to benchmarks and standards, which are derived from a mix
of international instruments. While there is a general justification for drawing on
international instruments, which all member and candidate states have ratified, dis-
crepancies occur where this is not the case. Concrete examples for the different
treatment of the candidate states as compared to the present Member States are
                                                     
85 Some inconsistencies that can be found will be illustrated in the next chapter which assesses the
content of the reports.
86 Taking human rights as whole and asking how consistently these are woven into the EU’s policies,
this statement must be further qualified. In practice, a whole range of DGs deal with human rights. “The result
is that no individual Commissioner and no senior EU bureaucrat can be identified as the visible face of human
rights, either within the Commission or viewed form outside” (Alston/Weiler 1999: 36). Moreover, Alston and
Weiler criticise that the Commission is under-staffed, that it is lacking expertise and bureaucratic “clout”,
“none of the bureaucratic entities responsible for human rights policy is large enough to develop the range of
staff and the level of expertise required to contribute to the development of the ‘consistent, efficient, credible
and conspicuous’ human rights policy which the Union aspires” (1999: 35).
87 The author hence continues: “The Copenhagen critera are not legally binding; they are merely of a
political nature, being adopted in the conclusions of the European Council. Nevertheless, in a indirect sense
they might be seen as legally binding in as far as they reflect already existing law. Hence the question whether
‘respect for and the protection of minorities’ is part of the acquis or not, should be raised. If no legal Com-
munity standard is identified, the standard applied in the course of eastern enlargement has to be of (more or
less) political nature” (Toggenburg 2000: 18).65
easily to be found, even on the very fundamental level of adhesion to international
instruments. For instance, while the CEEC are urged to comply with the require-
ments of the Framework Convention on Use of Minority Languages, only eight of
the fifteen EU Member States have presently ratified the Convention. Even more
pressure is put on the future members to accede to the Framework Convention for
National Minorities which five of the present Member States but only one of the
applicants have not ratified.
88 Despite the fact that one third of the EU-15 fail to
ratify the Framework Convention, the Commission uses it as one of its main frames
of reference to monitor the Copenhagen minority criterion and the latest Regular
Report states unmistakably that “Latvia is urged to ratify it” (RR 2002 LV).
Monitoring the criterion “minority protection” thus implies apparent contradictions
concerning the EU’s internal and external approach to human rights, which raise
questions about the “sustainability” of the set of standards which the Commission
has developed in the pre-accession context. According to Guy, the contradictory
positions the EU takes “about the necessary extent of compliance with EU require-
ments on minority rights for accession are less surprising when it is recognised that
they reflect a deep ambivalence on this subject within the Community. EU incon-
sistency in demanding that CEE applicants respect the rights of the minorities,
while remaining virtually silent about those of the existing members, has been
noted by various scholars. [...] This contradiction led the Brahams to fear the re-
moval of Roma minority rights from CEE agendas following accession” (Guy 2001:
18).
89 This worry is aggravated by the positions the Member States have taken to-
wards minority protection on the latest fora, i.e. in the discussions on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and other human rights initiatives which make it
“necessary to examine the expressiveness and the nature of a Copenhagen criterion
which was not elevated to the nobility of Primary law” (Toggenburg 2000: 17).
                                                     
88 The Member States which have not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
are France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (with the latter four having not even
signed the Charter). The Framework Convention has not been ratified by Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands (France being the only state not having even signed). Latvia has signed but not yet ratified the
Framework Convention.
89 “It remains to be seen whether the EU and other supranational institutions will demand real compli-
ance with entry criteria as regards Roma or will tacitly accept that the costs of achieving socio-economic
equalisation and the problems of enforcing the removal of discrimination are insuperable in the short term.
Following this logic, all that can be realistically required of applicants is a show of good will in the form of
legislation which, while enhancing the formal rights and status of Roma, leaves their material prospects fun-
damentally unchanged and therefore their dominant social identity” (Guy 2001: 23).66
Against this background, Abdikeeva arrives at the harsh appraisal that “Member
States have shown at best indifference, and at worst fierce opposition to elevating
protection of their minorities to the level of integration objectives – or even fully
recognising its relevance” (2001: 2). At the heart of the “sustainability” problem
hence lays the question of how much political will exists on the part of the Member
States to establish genuine EU standards of minority protection.
That “sustainability” in the monitoring of the political criteria will be a mi-
nor concern after accession has been further amplified by the Commission’s 2002
Strategy Paper. The document suggests to include specific internal market safe-
guard mechanisms into the Accession Treaties which would prologue Brussels’
mandate to monitor the future Member States on those economic criteria which
have not been fully implemented by the date of accession. However, no safeguard
clauses are proposed with view to minority protection – another area where most
applicant states are still far from meeting the standards referred to so far in the Co-
penhagen framework.
It may thus be concluded that not so much the implementation of the monitoring
process, nor are inconsistent units of measurement in the different reports a funda-
mental problem. As far as the actual implementation procedures are concerned, the
Commission works with high efficiency. However, the transposition of the political
criterion into workable, tangible standards and benchmarks is critical. Again, the
problem is not so much of a technical nature, as there are a broad number of valu-
able international instruments from which the Commission draws to establish its
proper set of monitoring standards. Yet, where the Commission refers to interna-
tional instruments whose standards are not part of the acquis but are used to opera-
tionalise the minority criterion, the EU faces a general credibility deficit which is
structurally given in the Copenhagen monitoring framework.
EU monitoring suffers hence not from inconsistency deriving from technical prob-
lems to provide an unbiased equal treatment of all applicant states. Instead, it suf-
fers from a structural deficiency that derives from a legally inconsistent foundation
of minority protection in the European Union.67
Contents of the Commission’s Monitoring
As pointed out, scrutinising the contents of the Regular Reports horizontal (cross-
country) and vertical (over the years) consistency are or relevance. Yet, there are
still two further aspects to it. A third category relates to consistency between the
issues mentioned and the actually existing problems, i.e. no aspects of minority
protection may be excluded or overemphasised. Last but not least, the content of
the reports needs to be consistent as far as the criticism raised and the final evalua-
tions are concerned, i.e. consistency between the self-set standards and the conclu-
sions drawn from the contents of the monitoring process must be guaranteed.
Scrutinising the outcomes of the drafting process, certain shortcomings in provid-
ing full consistency can be identified with regard to all four spheres. However,
these inconsistencies must be carefully distinguished and differentiated. As will be
pointed out, horizontal and vertical consistency, as well as consistency of the issues
listed in the reports, do not seriously challenge the trustworthiness of the reports’
effectiveness. Nonetheless, some of the discrepancies in these fields shall be men-
tioned.
The Open Society Institute offers a thorough examination in which it lists
shortcomings in the assessment of almost every country. Hinting to vertical incon-
sistencies, the Institute, referring to Bulgaria, criticises that the reporting appeared
“somewhat inconsistent” since certain issues raised in the 1999 report were not
followed up in 2000 “notwithstanding their persistence” and that certain serious
issues were not taken up at all (OSI 2001: 79). Similarly, it is brought forward that
tasks listed in the 1999 Accession Partnership of the Czech Republic’s “have not
been adequately monitored” in the Regular Reports (OSI 2001: 125).
The bulk of criticism focuses on aspects the Open Society Institute considers
central but which are, however, missing in the reports. Thus, the Estonian reports
are found not faultfinding enough with view to certain language laws. Furthermore,
the Institute asserts that the criticism actually raised “appears, from the perspective
of minority rights, modest” (OSI 2001: 179). Still another aspect finds mentioning
with regard to Latvia. In the eyes of the Institute, Latvia’s “accession priorities [...]
are brief and arguably do not reflect the major concerns of Latvia ’s minorities”
and, moreover, “[a]lthough the Commission bases its evaluations of government
compliance with the political criteria largely on the assessment of other bodies,68
notably the OSCE and the Council of Europe, it has, in the view of some, lent little
public support to the concerns expressed by these bodies” with the result that
“[a]bsent the requisite nuance, the Commission ’s relatively cursory public state-
ments are susceptible to misinterpretation, particularly by those seeking endorse-
ment of existing government policies” (OSI 2001: 269-270).
Finally, in the Hungarian case, a fundamental question is brought up which
can actually be raised vis-à-vis all reports. Referring to the overall evaluation it is
put into question why the Commission assesses the state to fulfil the political crite-
rion minority protection while it continues to evaluate the situation of the Roma
minority to be unsatisfactory (OSI 2001: 217-218).
Some of these critical points are surely worth considering and might provoke con-
troversial discourses. Yet, it shall be refrained from entering such discussions be-
cause the first three categories of inconsistencies respecting the content do not rep-
resent major quandaries. The greatest part of these contradictions may be explained
to derive from, on the one hand, unavoidable – yet not structurally given – failings
and, on the other hand, the particularly prudent approach the Commission takes vis-
à-vis this sensitive topic (cf. above p. 31). Furthermore, horizontal differences be-
tween the reports can also sometimes be found because certain issues attain more
attention in the specific context of one state while they are more or less neglected
in another.
However, the discrepancies between the Commission’s set of standards and
its evaluations are of a different quality and raise the question why these inconsis-
tencies occur. Again, the most plausible answer relates back to the fundamental
legal gap already elaborated on. Although the Commission can quite freely list
breaches of minority standards, it would be hard to defend a fully consistent
evaluation which would state that due to insufficient minority protection a candi-
date country should not be admitted to a Union of states which itself cannot agree
on formalising these very standards. Hence, although the Commission manages
with sure instinct to bridge the legal gap in the field of minority protection, in the
last consequence its monitoring faces in a full-blown credibility deficit.
Still another facet is discussed by Guy who reverses our perspective by inquiring
whether the CEEC are after all capable of meeting the standards monitored under69
the Copenhagen criteria. The author argues with regard to Roma rights that par-
ticularly the financial resources of the candidate countries are obviously not suffi-
cient to meet the Copenhagen criterion. Since the applicant states will in no way be
able to erase the socio-economic disadvantage of Roma, Guy agrees with Braham
and Braham that it is unlikely that the criterion “can be fulfilled other than in
merely formal terms in the foreseeable future, and certainly not by the time of ac-
cession” (Braham/Braham quoted by Guy 2001: 16). Subscribing to this point of
view, the Commission’s positive evaluations can also be interpreted as a pragmatic
approach to reality: The candidates are not able to fully implement measures to
provide for minority protection, thus effective adhesion to the criteria at legal level
suffices to meet the criterion.
In sum, the Commission’s assessment can be described, on the one hand, as very
effective and efficient with regard to the practical and procedural implementation
of its monitoring mandate. This includes the solution the institution has found fac-
ing the lack of legal provisions on the EU level. By referring to international in-
struments it has established its own set of standards for minority protection, plus a
comprehensive system of mechanisms to apply these standards. Nevertheless, on
the other hand, the fact that the legal basis the Commission builds on (without
pointing this out explicitly) is not part of the EU legal system corrupts the moni-
toring process in a two-fold manner by posing a serious credibility deficit. First, it
makes the monitoring of minority issues appear as a merely remittent phenomenon
that will end with accession and which actually has no real advocate within the EU.
Thus, “sustainability” is not guaranteed and the issue will lose momentum once the
candidate states have become full members. Secondly, the fact that the Commission
has to apply standards with view to the accession candidates which do not account
for the present Member States, the official goal of the monitoring process, i.e. a
strict evaluation of the states’ preparedness to enter the Union on the basis of the
Copenhagen criterion, cannot be realised.
90
                                                     
90 Williams comes to this conclusion as one of two possible answers to the outcomes of Commission’s
evaluations. “[T]he Commission has concluded constantly that most applicant states have fulfilled the Copen-
hagen political criteria [...]. One must conclude, therefore, that either the criteria is flawed (in the sense that
in reality it operates as no more than a guide rather than a condition) or the Commission has engaged upon a
human rights policy determined to interfere in the affairs of potential members regardless of whether or not
the applicants’ level of observance of the human rights standards would be accepted internally” (Williams
2000: 616).70
Conclusion
Three essential shortcomings in the EU’s monitoring of minority issues have been
asserted, namely: structural inconsistencies of standards, a thereof deriving credi-
bility deficit of the Commission’s evaluations, and an imbalance between the Co-
penhagen demands and the resources the CEEC can actually deliver to achieve
these goals. Yet, it would be too simple a judgement to draw the conclusion that the
Commission’s assessment in the annual Regular Reports is simply flawed. Al-
though the generally suggested purpose of the Copenhagen criteria is arguably not
met, i.e. the final decision on whether a state may or may not accede to the Euro-
pean Union is more a political than a technical decision based on clear and unbi-
ased measures, the shortcomings in strictly applying the minority criterion does not
discredit the assessment as such.
Taking a broader perspective on minority issues in the context of EU policy-
making, the most central impact of the Copenhagen monitoring framework was
that, for the first time, a comprehensive approach to minority protection has moved
on the EU agenda – even if it remained restricted to a limited section of the
agenda.
91 As the claims uttered by both scientific scholars and NGOs
92 indicate the
continuation and extension of safeguarding minority protection has become a
prominent issue. This allows the conclusion that once politicised the now “hot is-
sue”, minority protection will not suddenly cool down with enlargement. It is more
likely that public and private preoccupation with the topic will persist in one way
or another.
                                                     
91 In his detailed historic review on how the EU has dealt with minority questions Toggenburg thus
states: “Especially the EU’s eastern enlargement provided an impetus to look beyond the linguistic dimension
of minorities in Europe, giving the minority question a clear political (and legal) dimension. This new ap-
proach, however, seems to be limited to minorities in Central and Eastern Europe” (2000: 11).
92 To provide just two examples from the broad amount of literature: Amato and Batt argue that “[i]n
particular, the area of minority rights seems set to reach the political agenda of an enlarged EU. There are
several reasons why the EU should become more actively involved in minority rights“ (1998: 6) and the
Open Society Institute comments: “On the eve of enlargement, there is an urgent necessity to ensure that
the momentum generated by the accession process is not lost. There are some indications that candidate
State Governments have viewed their efforts to demonstrate compliance with the political criteria instru-
mentally, rather than as a genuine and permanent commitment. [...] Such attitudes must be answered defi-
nitely, and prior to admission; it must be made clear that compliance with basic democratic standards is
more than a condition for entry; it is a condition for membership This will inevitably require a different
approach that  focuses on the EU’s ability and willingness to maintain its focus on minority protection in
the post-enlargement context” (OSI 2002: 17).71
Considering the future classification of minority protection in the EU it is neces-
sary, once more, to recall the problem of different internal and external standards.
The question of which significance minority protection will be attributed remains
open. Will the EU extend its legislation in the field, or will the level of awareness
in the future Member States be reduced? In the strict sense of their meaning, both
options seem little likely. Neither will the Member States show willing to equip the
supranational level with further means to monitor minority protection; nor can the
EU allow to let the still multiple and unsolved deficiencies in minority protection
in the CEEC to be unobserved. Yet, to avoid the problem of double standards which
can not be kept up after accession, the most likely vision for the future monitoring
of minority issues is that these will be dealt with on the basis of individual com-
plaints only, i.e. through the legal framework that has been created with the intro-
duction of the anti-discrimination acquis and the Race Directive.
Taking a positive stand on this, one can argue that the EU prepared itself to
ensure the protection of minorities in all future Member States and that minority
protection will gain further momentum in future.
93 Still, many commentators are
much more sceptical in their estimations and argue that the EU still lacks essential
credentials for a serious minority policy.
94 Avoiding to be deeper drawn into the
rather hypothetical discourse on legal developments within a future European Un-
ion, we can however conclude that the existence and application of the Copenhagen
criterion has already had an influence on the EU legal framework. The extension of
anti-discrimination and fundamental rights legislation was, at least partially, influ-
enced by the standards developed in the Copenhagen framework. In the context of
the Convention on the Future of Europe fundamental rights are being ascribed an
even greater importance. Although it is presently unpredictable whether the far-
reaching proposals will indeed be implemented, the fact that certain recommenda-
tions will be passed by the Convention will exert further pressure on the develop-
ment of more comprehensive human rights standards in the EU legal framework.
                                                     
93 See, for instance, Toggenburg who argues that the Copenhagen political criteria not included in the
acquis are “no legal condition for accession or membership. The role given to the criterion of minority pro-
tection will primarily depend on the political constellation dominating the respective phase of Eastern en-
largement. Still, in political terms it seems quite impossible that in the future the EC will take essential retro-
grade steps as it has already devoted significant attention to its new approach towards minorities” (2000: 19).
94 A very rigorous position is advocated by Abdikeeva: “Returning to the original question of what ‘EU
standards’ of human rights protection are to be met by the accession candidates, the answer appears truly
disconcerting: there are none. If the European Union itself presently has any standards worth mentioning, they
are double standards. Without immediate and meaningful measures to correct this situation, the EU’s example
in human rights and minority protection risks being a bad one” (2001: 3).72
Last but not least, it is noticeable that the Commission has developed far-reaching
expertise and mechanisms to manage the difficult assignment of monitoring minor-
ity protection. Despite the stated contradictions the Copenhagen standards are
based on, despite the credibility deficit of the Commission’s evaluations, and de-
spite the CEEC’s de facto incapability to meet all the standards spelled out, the
Commission keeps up a stringent assessment which meticulously states the standing
of minority protection in the candidate countries. What is the value of this consid-
ering the shortcomings of the final assessment? Two essential aspects may serve as
an answer.
First, by extending its activities to a new policy sector the Commission has
expanded its scope of influence and hence its institutional impact. Although moni-
toring will not continue in the same form as it was developed in the pre-accession
process, learning processes that were necessary to carry out this task will most
probably also influence the future acting of the institution where minority issues
are at issue. It ma hence be concluded that it was in the institutional interest of the
Commission to use the rights transferred to it under the monitoring mandate to its
limits. This was especially the case in a policy area not formally part of the acquis
because it allowed the Commission to attain new capabilities and shape the mode
the EU applies these.
The second impact monitoring had is related to what has been said on mi-
nority issues entering the EU agenda. Less than adapting the acquis to the end that
minority rights become an integral part, yet more than only monitoring external
actors, the EU has developed its own action programmes to tackle challenges of
minority protection.
95 These policy approaches, on the one hand, truly support the
underlining aim of the whole process as such, i.e. to improve the situation of mi-
norities in the candidate states. On the other hand, considering that once integrated
into the Union remaining deficiencies in the “respect for and protection of minori-
ties” will become common problems, these programmes might point into the direc-
tion of a genuine EU minority-policy, at least on the practical level of trying to find
                                                     
95 See: Commission of the European Communities, DG Enlargement Information Unit (1999 a) En-
largement Briefing: EU Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe. December 1999;
Commission of the European Communities, DG Enlargement Information Unit (2002 c): Enlargement Brief-
ing: EU Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern Europe. May 2002.73
solutions to improve the situation of the Roma and Russian speaking minorities this
study has focussed on.74
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